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BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME,
EXPERT TESTIMONY, AND THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN
JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE
Robert F. Schopp*
Barbara J. Sturgis**
Megan Sullivan***
Robert Schopp and his coauthors, Barbara Sturgis and Megan
Sullivan, discuss the practical effects and the viability of the bat-
tered woman syndrome as a support for self-defense. The authors
detail the conflict inherent in demonstrating the "reasonableness"
of the defendants' actions through the premise that she was psycho-
logically impaired. They argue that current research on battered
women does not show key characteristics posited by the theory.
The authors conclude that, use of the syndrome to support a legal
defense is misleading and may harm the credibility of women in
their claims of self-defense.
I. INTRoDucnoN
A series of controversial criminal cases has addressed the exercise
of deadly force by battered women against their mates with whom
they had engaged in extended relationships involving patterns of re-
petitive physical abuse of the women by the mates. In some of these
cases the battered women exercised this force during an episode of
physical abuse by the batterers.1 In others the defendants exerted
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The authors are grateful to Martin R. Gardner for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and
to several members of the faculty at the University of Nebraska College of Law and the Univer-
sity of San Diego School of Law for helpful comments made at faculty colloquia.
1. Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Cur-
rent Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 391-97 (1991) (analyzing a series of appellate
opinions regarding such cases). Ordinarily, the batterer is the husband, estranged husband, or
unofficial mate of the battered woman, but the broad principles discussed in this article also
apply to other relationships such as that of an abused elderly person living with a battering adult
offspring.
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deadly force against the batterers in the absence of any occurrent
abuse but in anticipation of renewed attacks. Some of the latter cases
have occurred in circumstances in which the batterers presented no
overt evidence of immediate threat because they were reclining in an-
other room or sleeping?
Commentators ordinarily refer to these two contrasting factual
patterns respectively as confrontation and nonconfrontation cases.
Although they dispute the relative frequency of each type of case,
commentators agree that both occur and that the latter present more
difficult circumstances for defendants who claim self-defense under
traditional legal doctrine? Early legal commentary regarding claims
of self-defense by battered women often concentrated on the substan-
tive law of self-defense and on the admissibility of expert testimony
regarding the battered woman syndrome as relevant to self-defense.
Some writers criticized substantive self-defense law as biased against
battered women or against women generally and advocated either
modifications of self-defense standards or a separate defense.4 Many
advocated admission of expert testimony regarding the battered wo-
man syndrome as necessary to dispel stereotypes of battered women
and to establish various components of the traditional or modified
defenses.5
Recent articles address evidentiary and procedural issues as well
as potential confounding effects of expert testimony regarding the bat-
tered woman syndrome.6 Such testimony can mislead courts or juries
when it is offered in support of a self-defense claim, but interpreted as
evidence of mental illness relevant to the insanity defense, state of
mind, or criminal intent.7 The battered woman syndrome may be-
come a new stereotype if expert testimony regarding the syndrome
becomes so closely associated with self-defense by battered women
that these defendants must establish that they suffer from the syn-
2. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9 (N.C. 1989); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 313-14
(Wash. 1984); Maguigan, supra note 1, at 391-97.
3. Compare CHARLES P. EWING, BArrERED WOMEN WHO KILL 34,99-142 (1987) (stating
that two-thirds of such homicides occur in nonconfrontation conditions) with Maguigan, supra
note I, at 388-401 (indicating that most homicides occur during confrontations).
4. Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-
Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 121, 152 (1985) (calling for a new construct of self-defense);
EWING, supra note 3, at 78-94 (discussing psychological self-defense as legal justification); Kit
Kinports, Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393,415-22 (1988)
(advocating a reasonable battered woman standard).
5. EWING, supra note 3, at 94; Kinports, supra note 4, at 407-08; Maguigan, supra note I,
at 451-58; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and
the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195,205-20 (1986); see
infra notes 23-103 and accompanying text regarding the battered woman syndrome.
6. Maguigan, supra note 1, at 420-42, 451-58 (discussing evidentiary and procedural is-
sues); Schneider, supra note 5, at 198-200 (describing possible confounding effects of expert
testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome).
7. State v. Edwards, 420 So. 2d 663, 677-78 (La. 1982); State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660,
663-65 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Schneider, supra note 5, at 198-200.
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drome in order to substantiate a defense.8 Emphasis on the battered
woman syndrome can distort the legal issues as the parties dispute
whether the defendant suffered from the syndrome rather than disput-
ing the justification for her use of defensive force.9
Although expert testimony regarding the battered woman syn-
drome has gained wide acceptance in the courts, the empirical founda-
tion and legal significance of this syndrome remain obscure.lO This
article examines the empirical support for the syndrome and the rela-
tionship between the syndrome and self-defense doctrine in an effort
to establish the appropriate interpretation and integration of these
clinical and legal frameworks in circumstances in which battered wo-
men exercise deadly force against their batterers. This article ad-
vances the following five theses. First, although expert testimony
regarding the battered woman syndrome has been widely admitted as
relevant to self-defense, the sources usually cited as support for the
syndrome by the admitting courts do not provide strong reason to ac-
cept it either as a clinical syndrome or as relevant to self-defense. Ad-
ditional research provides at best equivocal support for the syndrome,
and certain aspects of the syndrome that receive primary emphasis in
the cases find little or no support in the research.H
Second, although future research might support the battered wo-
man syndrome as a clinical syndrome, the battered woman syndrome
as usually formulated has almost no relevance to self-defense doctrine
or cases, including those regarding which this evidence has been ad-
mitted. Third, despite the irrelevance of the battered woman syn-
drome to these cases, expert and nonexpert testimony regarding
battering relationships generally, and each particular defendant's rela-
tionship with her batterer, remains relevant. Fourth, standard self-de-
fense doctrine, properly understood and applied to the facts,
accommodates many of these cases. Fifth, the judicial opinions and
the commentary demonstrate the practical significance of rigorous
theoretical analysis of criminal law doctrine. Much of the doctrinal
and applied controversy regarding these cases arises directly from the
failure of legislatures and courts to maintain a clear and consistent
8. State v. Kelly, 685 P.2d 564, 570-71, 573-75 (Wash. 1984) (majority and dissent disputing
the admissibility of evidence regarding whether the defendant suffered from the battered woman
syndrome); Kinports, supra note 4, at 452-53 (discussing a rigid stereotype of the battered wo-
man); Schneider, supra note 5, at 207 (discussing the battered woman syndrome as suggesting to
some that all battered women are the same).
9. Kelly, 685 P.2d at 570-71, 573-75 (majority and dissent disputing the admissibility of
evidence regarding whether the defendant suffered from the battered woman syndrome); Ste-
phen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in Criminal Law, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'y 105, 119-20
(1990) (discussing potential disputes about defendants' conduct not typical of the battered wo-
man syndrome).
10. Maguigan, supra note 1, at 452; Schneider, supra note 5, at 200-01 (both authors discuss
wide acceptance); see infra notes 34-103 and accompanying text (examining the empirical basis
for the battered woman syndrome).
11. See infra notes 34-103 and accompanying text (examining the empirical research).
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formulation of important conceptual issues, including the distinction
between justification and excuse.
This analysis pursues both practical and theoretical agendas.
Practically, it examines the appropriate role of evidence regarding the
battered woman syndrome and the battering relationship in these
cases. Theoretically, it addresses several controversial concerns aris-
ing in the theory of self-defense doctrine and in the broader theory of
justification and excuse. Finally, it demonstrates the importance of
these theoretical considerations in resolving the applied questions that
become particularly cogent when battered women exercise deadly
force against their batterers.
This project requires integration of analytic, empirical, and nor-
mative components. The analytic tasks involve clarification of several
important concepts that remain either vague or ambiguous, giving rise
to disputes among courts and commentators. These concepts include,
for example, those represented by "battered woman syndrome," "rea-
sonable belief," "imminence," and "objective." Evaluation of the sig-
nificance of the battered woman syndrome for self-defense requires
not only a clarification of the meaning of "battered woman syndrome"
but also an examination of the empirical evidence supporting the
claim that this syndrome occurs in the form alleged.12 The exercise of
force in self-defense is justified only when the party exercising that
force has no safe alternative means of protecting herself. Support for
this contention as applied to women who kill their batterers also re-
quires examination of the empirical evidence regarding the availabil-
ity or lack thereof of legal alternatives to defensive forceP
Finally, this project involves normative argument because it pur-
sues both explicative and prescriptive aims. We address the signifi-
cance of the battered woman syndrome for the law of self-defense as
that law ought to be formulated and understood, supporting this inter-
pretation by appeal to the principles that justify the use of defensive
force. 14 Throughout the article, we attempt to explicitly identify and
integrate these analytic, empirical, and normative components to sup-
port our theses regarding the manner in which evidence regarding bat-
tering ought to be integrated with self-defense doctrine.
This argument addresses several audiences, including experts,
lawyers, and judges, regarding the appropriate use and interpretation
of expert testimony concerning the putative relevance of the battered
woman syndrome to self-defense. It is certainly not the case, how-
ever, that all courts currently accept evidence and argument based on
the theory advanced here. Legislators and courts constitute the sec-
12. See infra notes 34-103 and accompanying text (examining the empirical research).
13. See infra notes 140-233 and accompanying text (examining the evidence regarding legal
assistance).
14. See infra notes 244-326 and accompanying text.
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ond audience in that the arguments presented here are directly rele-
vant to the appropriate formulation and interpretation of the
substantive law of self-defense. We accept the well-settled contempo-
rary law of self-defense, and we interpret the vague or controversial
aspects of that doctrine in a manner consistent with the justificatory
foundation it represents. Thus, we examine the relevance of expert
testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome to the substantive
law of self-defense as it ought to be understood. Finally, we address
theoreticians insofar as we pursue conceptually consistent approaches
to these cases.
Part II briefly describes dominant self-defense doctrine, the bat-
tered woman syndrome, and the putative relevance of the latter to the
former. This part identifies the aspects of the battered woman syn-
drome usually advanced as specifically relevant to self-defense. Anal-
ysis of the sources usually cited as support for the syndrome and of
related research does not provide good reason to accept the empirical
claims ordinarily made about these aspects of the battered woman
syndrome. The possibility remains, however, that future data might
provide support for the syndrome as usually formulated or in some
alternative variation.
Accordingly, part III assumes future data will support the bat-
tered woman syndrome as a clinical syndrome and examines its signif-
icance for self-defense. Part IV analyzes several problematic aspects
of self-defense doctrine and attempts to clarify the most justifiable in-
terpretation of certain controversial elements. Application of the bat-
tered woman syndrome to these components demonstrates that the
history of the battering relationship rather than the syndrome is pri-
marily relevant to self-defense. This process also reveals the signifi-
cance of the distinction between justification and excuse in these
cases, and it explicates the importance of this distinction in the context
of particular fact patterns involving both the battering relationship
and the available legal alternatives to violent defense. Part V con-
cludes the argument.
II. THE HAlTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AND SELF-DEFENSE
A. Self-Defense Doctrine
The parameters and variations of self-defense doctrine have been
discussed extensively elsewhere. An outline of the primary compo-
nents of the doctrine, however, is appropriate. Individuals may exer-
cise force in self-defense only when they reasonably believe that doing
so is necessary to protect themselves from the imminent use of unlaw-
ful force by others. I5 Deadly defensive force requires that the actor
15. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN w. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7 (2d ed. 1986);
PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES §§ 131, 132 (1984).
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reasonably believe it necessary to defend against the imminent use of
unlawful force threatening death or serious'bodily injury.16 Some ju-
risdictions adopt the Model Penal Code provision requiring only be-
lief, rather than reasonable belief. Other jurisdictions limit the
defense to cases of actual necessity, disregarding entirely the defend-
ants' beliefs regarding that necessityP The Model Penal Code allows
liability for negligent or reckless homicide for those who exercise
deadly defensive force on the basis of negligently or recklessly held
beliefs about the necessity of using such force.1s A large majority of
jurisdictions require reasonable belief in the necessity of exercising
deadly force, either explicitly or through provisions similar to those of
the Model Penal Code.19
Although some jurisdictions require retreat before exercising
deadly defensive force, the majority do not, and those that do usually
provide a dwelling exception for persons who are attacked in their
own homes?O Thus, for most cases of self-defense by battered women
involving attacks occurring in the home, the defendant has no duty to
retreat?1 States vary in their treatment of the imminence require-
ment. Some jurisdictions require an imminent attack. Others require
an immediate attack or that the defensive force be immediately
necessary.22
B. The Battered Woman Syndrome
The dominant conception of the battered woman syndrome as
described in court opinions and by commentators is advanced by Le-
nore Walker.23 It includes interpersonal and intrapersonal compo-
nents.24 The interpersonal component takes the form of the cycle of
16. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note IS, § 5.7(b); ROBINSON, supra note IS, § 131(d). Deadly
force includes force threatening serious bodily injury. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(2) (Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1985); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note IS, § 5.7(a).
17. MODEL PENAL CoDE, supra note 16, § 3.04(1); ROBINSON, supra note IS, §§ 121(c),
184(a),(b).
18. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 16, § 3.09.
19. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note IS, §§ 5.7(b), (c).
20. MODEL PENAL CoDE, supra note 16, § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(1); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note
IS, § 5.7(f). Only a small minority of jurisdictions recognize a cohabitant exception to the dwell-
ing exception.
21. Maguigan, supra note I, at 419-20.
22. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note IS, § 5.7(d); ROBINSON, supra note IS, § 131(c); Magui-
gan, supra note I, at 414-16. See infra notes 104-20 and accompanying text for further discussion
of this requirement.
23. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 369-73 (N.J. 1984); LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN SYNDROME (1984) [hereinafter BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME]; LENORE E. WALKER,
BATTERED WOMAN (1979) [hereinafter BATTERED WOMAN]. Kelly is often cited as the leading
case addressing the relevance of the battered woman syndrome for self-defense, so we will use it
to illustrate the most commonly accepted view. Kinports, supra note 4, at 396-408 (one of many
commentators accepting Walker's theory of the battered woman syndrome).
24. It is very difficult to define the precise scope of the battered woman syndrome as
Walker uses the term. Walker initially included the fact of battering, its widespread existence
and the underreporting of incidents of battering in the battered woman syndrome. BATTERED
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violence, which consists of a three-part repetitive pattern of interac-
tion consisting of periods of gradual tension building, acute violence,
and loving contrition. During the third phase the batterer apologizes
for the acute violence and promises that it will not recur. Although
courts and commentators describe all three phases, some battering re-
lationships include only part of the cycle.25 Repeated episodes of
abuse within an ongoing relationship constitute the only common in-
terpersonal factor across all cases.
Courts and commentators have generally emphasized the in-
trapersonal component of the battered woman syndrome when ex-
plaining the significance of the syndrome for these cases. They
contend the recurring cycle of violence promotes a predictable set of
psychological responses in the victims of battering. This set includes
most prominently: depression, decreased self-esteem, and learned
helplessness. This last trait consists of a perception of oneself as help-
less to alter the battering relationship. People who suffer learned
helplessness reportedly perceive themselves as having little or no abil-
ity to affect their own lives in general or the battering in particular.
Courts and commentators have emphasized the significance of
learned helplessness in explaining the relevance of expert testimony
regarding battered woman syndrome to claims of self-defense.26
For the sake of clarity and consistency we follow the common
practice of the courts and commentators in reserving the term "bat-
tered woman syndrome" for the set of intrapersonal psychological
characteristics including depression, decreased self-esteem, and
learned helplessness. We refer to the interpersonal relationship in-
WOMAN, supra note 23, at 19. At that time, she used "learned helplessness syndrome" to ex-
plain, at least in part, how women respond to battering and "delayed action syndrome" to de-
scribe battered women's tendency to delay seeking help after an acute episode of battering. [d.
at 58, 63.
Walker later redefined the battered woman syndrome as "the feelings, thoughts, and behav-
iors which constitute this syndrome as a reaction to a man's violence" and the "cluster of psycho-
logical sequela from living in a violent relationship" that women develop. BAlTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME, supra note 23, at xi, 1; see also People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 177 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) (quoting Walker describing the battered woman syndrome as a pattern of psychological
symptoms developing after the battered woman lives in a battering relationship). She also con-
tinued using the term broadly, encompassing both the battered woman's intrapersonal response
to battering and all of the interpersonal variables in the battering relationship. BAlTERED Wo-
MAN SYNDROME, supra note 23, at 67-71. See infra notes 256-81 and accompanying text for an
analysis of the battered woman syndrome with particular attention to whether the classification
of these two components as parts of a syndrome is consistent with the notion of a syndrome,
claims about the relationship of the battered woman syndrome to mental illness, and the puta-
tive significance of the battered woman syndrome to self-defense. Here, we merely describe
briefly the battered woman syndrome as it has been articulated by courts and commentators.
25. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 371; BAlTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 23, at 95-97;
Kinports, supra note 4, at 397.
26. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377; People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361-62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985);
State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315-16 (Wash. 1984); BAlTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note
23, at 86-94, 147; Kinports, supra note 4, at 398, 416; Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 119-22.
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cluding repeated episodes of abuse within an ongoing relationship as
the "battering relationship" or the "pattern of battering."
C. The Putative Relevance of the Battered Woman Syndrome to
Self-Defense
Courts and commentators have argued that expert testimony re-
garding the battered woman syndrome provides juries with important
information regarding several aspects of self-defense. Although com-
mentators disagree about the relative frequency of confrontation and
nonconfrontation cases, they agree that some cases involve circum-
stances in which the defendants exercise violence in the absence of an
imminent overt attack.27 Some contend that expert testimony regard-
ing the battered woman syndrome explains how these defendants
could reasonably believe that attacks were forthcoming and that de-
fensive force was necessary despite the absence of immediate vio-
lence. Some courts and commentators discuss a special ability to
perceive subtle clues of forthcoming violence as part of the battered
woman syndrome, arguing that this aspect of the syndrome renders
the perception of imminent violence reasonable despite the lack of
external indicators accessible to most people.2s
Some extend this reasoning to the issue of deadly force, arguing
that the battered woman syndrome explains why these battered wo-
men reasonably believed deadly force to be necessary. According to
this line of reasoning, the special capacity to perceive forthcoming vio-
lence absent overt indicators also enables these battered women to
reasonably foresee that the violence will be of such severity as to jus-
tify the use of deadly force in self-defense. Thus, those who suffer
from the syndrome can reasonably believe that deadly defensive force
is necessary in circumstances in which such a belief would not appear
reasonable to others. This argument concludes that expert testimony
regarding the battered woman syndrome can explain to the jury the
manner in which the syndrome renders reasonable these beliefs.29
Some advocate expert testimony as relevant to the credibility of
the defendants' testimony. Many cases involve such intense and pro-
longed patterns of abuse that many jurors might doubt the defend-
ants' credibility. These jurors might conclude that the defendants
must be exaggerating the abuse because no one would have remained
in the relationship if such abuse had actually occurred.3D Such doubts
might then lead the jurors to generally discount the defendants' testi-
mony. Courts and commentators contend that expert testimony re-
27. See supra note 3 (citing commentators).
28. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377-78; Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 361-62; Kinports, supra note 4, at
416.
29. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377-78; Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 361-62.
30. State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268, 1271-72 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Norman, 378
S.E.2d 8, 9-11 (N.C. 1989); Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 313.
No.1] BATfERED WOMAN SYNDROME 53
garding the battered woman syndrome in general and learned
helplessness in particular can correct this tendency to discount the de-
fendants' testimony by enabling the jurors to understand that the de-
fendants could have remained in these relationships for extended
periods despite severe and frequent abuse. These witnesses explain
that defendants who suffer learned helplessness either fail to perceive
available alternatives to the relationships or are unable to exercise
these options. Thus, learned helplessness supports the credibility of
these defendants by rendering plausible their testimony that they re-
mained in battering relationships for extended periods despite endur-
ing severe abuse?!
Some endorse testimony regarding the battered woman syn-
drome as relevant to the claim that battered women are unable to
leave the relationship. This argument takes two forms. The first, a
variation of the credibility argument, depends on the contention that
these defendants remained because they were unable to leave. The
battered woman syndrome, particularly the learned helplessness as-
pect, explains the defendants' inability to leave their relationships ear-
lier and thus, it renders credible the defendants' testimony that they
did not leave despite the extended pattern of severe abuse.32 The sec-
ond form of this argument addresses the necessity requirement in self-
defense doctrine. Some jurors might conclude that the defendants'
use of defensive force was not necessary because they could have
avoided the danger by leaving t~e battering relationships. The de-
fendants rely on expert testimony regarding learned helplessness to
explain why they were unable to leave the relationship, and thus, that
defensive force was the only remaining method of self-protection.33
D. Battered Woman Syndrome Research
1. The Walker Studies
Cases and commentators rely heavily on Walker's 1979 and 1984
books.34 The 1979 book contains a description of the battered woman
syndrome as derived' from Walker's clinical observation' over an ex-
tended series of clinical cases. The syndrome formulated in this book
provides the basis for the 1984 book which reports a process of self-
report data collection designed to validate and refine knowledge of
the battered woman syndrome. Walker interprets this data as strong
support for the battered woman syndrome as she has described it.35
31. Kelly, 478 A.2d ,at 375; Kinports, supra note 4, at 398,
32. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 375; Kinports, supra note 4, at 400.
33. State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 570 (Kan. 1986); Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372, 377; Kinports,
supra note 4, at 416.
34. See sources cited supra note 23,
35. See generally BATTERED WOMEN SYNDROME, supra note 23.
54 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1994
Walker's earlier hypotheses about the reactions of battered wo-
men to the experience of battering described these women as having
low self-esteem, holding traditional attitudes about the role of women,
being the keepers of the peace in the marriage, suffering from severe
stress reactions, and having a history of childhood violence and sex-
role stereotyping?6 She also hypothesized that battered women suffer
from learned helplessness?7 Learned helplessness is a concept de-
rived from animal studies in which dogs were subjected to noncontin-
gent aversive stimuli and later failed to take advantage of readily
apparent opportunities to escape the aversive situation.38 Walker pos-
ited that the inability of battered women to control the violence in the
battering relationship would produce learned helplessness, thus ex-
plaining why many battered women remain in the battering relation-
ship when they might have left.39 Walker initially understood learned
helplessness as including an external locus of control (the tendency to
see one's life as controlled by forces outside oneself) and depression.40
Walker developed the cycle theory of violence to further explain the
battered woman's situation and to augment learned helplessness as an
explanation for the battered woman remaining in the battering
relationship.41
As Walker refined the theory, she correlated being in the bat-
tering relationship with a set of factors including traditional attitudes
toward the role of women, external locus of control, low self-esteem,
and depression, which explain the behavior of battered women within
the relationship. She reaffirmed the notion that both learned helpless-
ness and the cycle of violence affect the battered woman's decision to
remain in the battering relationship and reduce her motivation to
escape.42
Between 1978 and 1981, Walker studied over 400 women who
were or had been in a battering relationship.43 The study included
lengthy interviews as well as the administration of psychological scales
to measure the various personality characteristics Walker identified as
important in understanding battered women.
Commentators have criticized this research on several grounds.
The study relies on self-report survey data as elicited from a self-se-
lected sample, and Walker provided no control group of women who
were not in battering relationships, rendering it impossible to deter-
36. BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 23, at 32-35.
37. Id. at 47-49.
38. Id. at 45-46.
39. Id. at. 47-49.
40. Id. at 48-51. It is often difficult to determine the precise conception of learned helpless-
ness employed by Walker as well as by other commentators and by courts. See infra notes 121-
24, 257-81 and accompanying text for further discussion of this issue.
41. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
42. BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 23, at 75-85.
43. Id. at 1-4.
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mine whether her data was unique to battered women.44 Information
was gathered and recorded by interviewers who were familiar with the
battered woman syndrome and the study's hypotheses. Interviewers
were selected and trained in a manner calculated to produce a team
with expectations and political commitments supportive of the study's
hypotheses.45 These interviewers asked the questions, recorded the
battered women's answers, and coded their responses for analysis.46
This method of data gathering created substantial potential for
selective or biased self-reporting by the subjects as well as for distor-
tion through interviewer demand or bias in interpretation.47
Although survey data is generally vulnerable to these concerns, and
the conditions of selection and training exacerbate the danger of con-
tamination in this study, survey responses are sometimes the best data
available. Although different approaches to interviewer selection and
training might have reduced the potential for contamination, surveys
are widely used and accepted.48 Thus, these criticisms raise serious
concerns, but they do not in themselves render the study uninforma-
tive or inappropriate for consideration by courts or policymakers.
Other criticisms of Walker's study involve the lack of statistical
analysis to test the significance of some findings, and the absence of
clear theoretical foundations for interpretation of the data.49 In addi-
tion, the data as presented indicate that a substantial but indefinite
percentage of the subjects did not report experiencing the cycle of vio-
lence.50 This raised serious questions about the frequency of the cycle
of violence and about the intrapersonal aspect of the battered woman
syndrome because Walker posits a causal relationship between this in-
trapersonal component and the cycle of violence which ostensibly
causally contributes to it.51
Perhaps most troubling, however, is the apparent lack of clear
support in the data for the conclusions drawn. Walker hypothesized
that battered women had more traditional attitudes regarding the role
of women in society, contributing to their willingness to tolerate vio-
lence by the batterers in order to maintain their relationships because
they perceived few viable options for women.52 Walker found, how-
ever, that battered women presented themselves as less traditional
44. Id. at 202-09; David L. Faigman, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self-De-
fense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619, 642 (1986).
45. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 23, at 215-21.
46. Id. at 235.
47. Faigman, supra note 44, at 637-38 (discussing open-ended questions and experimenter
demand).
48. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Defendant-
Petitioner at 22, State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (NJ. 1984) (No. 20,219).
49. Faigman, supra note 44, at 636-43.
50. Id. at 639-40; Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 121.
51. BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 23, at 42-70.
52. Id. at 33-34.
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than the normative group of college students.53 Because of the con-
trol that batterers appear to exercise over battered women's lives,
Walker also hypothesized that battered women would see themselves
as having little control over their lives. Thus, she expected that bat-
tered women would manifest an external locus of control, reporting
that forces outside themselves have more influence than they do over
their lives. Contrary to this expectation, the battered women
presented themselves as having significantly more control over their
lives than did the sample on which norms for the measuring instru-
ment were based. Also contrary to hypotheses, battered women who
remained in the battering relationships portrayed themselves as feel-
ing less controlled by powerful others than was predicted in that they
did not differ significantly from the norm. Battered women described
their lives as more affected by chance than the norm.54
Walker hypothesized that women who remain in battering rela-
tionships would have low self-esteem and that they would suffer from
depression. Rather than suffering from low self-esteem, however,
Walker's sample of battered women saw themselves as "stronger,
more independent, and more sensitive than other women or men."55
While the sample of battered women scored well into the depressed
range on a self-report measure of depression,56 those women who had
remained married to the batterer revealed less depression than did
those who had left the battering relationship, directly contradicting
Walker's expectations.57
In sum, Walker's data does not support her hypotheses regarding
the personality characteristics of battered women. Contrary to hy-
potheses, her sample of battered women, both in and out of battering
relationships, demonstrated an internal locus of control and nontradi-
tional attitudes towards women's role in society. They also evaluated
themselves more positively than they rated other women or men. The
only factor that clearly and consistently scored in the predicted direc-
tion was depression. The battered women suffered more depression
than the norm. Depression, however, is symptomatic of a number of
widely varying psychological and interpersonal problems; it is far from
unique to the battered woman syndrome.58
To explain why some battered women remain in the battering re-
lationship despite apparent opportunities to leave, Walker hypothe-
sized the presence of both learned helplessness and a cycle of
53. BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 23, at 77-78.
54. [d. at 78-80.
55. [d. at 80.
56. [d. at 82.
57. [d.
58. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 229, 231 (3d ed. rev. 1987) (discussing Major Depression as occurring in 9-26% of
females, and Dysthymia as common). Walker recognizes that learned helplessness may be sy-
nonymous with exogenous depression. BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 23, at 82.
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violence. According to Walker, the noncontingent nature of the bat-
tering induces in the battered woman the belief that she cannot influ-
ence the events that affect her, reducing her motivation to respond in
a manner that might enable her to escape from the relationship.59 In
addition, the behavior of the batterer in phase three of the cycle of
violence-loving contrition-reinforces the battered woman's re-
maining in the relationship and believing the batterer will change.60
To determine the presence of learned helplessness, Walker mea-
sured the differences in levels of two clusters of emotions (fear/anxi-
ety/depression and anger/disgust/hostility) between those battered
women who remained in the battering relationship and those who had
left the battering relationship. She found that, at the time of the last
battering incident, the feelings of fear, anxiety, and depression of the
battered women who had left had peaked and were declining while
their levels of anger, disgust, and hostility were increasing. For those
battered women remaining in the relationship their levels of both clus-
ters of emotions were steadily increasing by the time of the last inci-
dent, but were lower in comparison with those battered women who
had left.61 Walker seems to understand the decline in the fearful emo-
tions and the increase in the angry emotions for those battered women
who had left as providing the impetus to break out of learned help-
lessness and leave the relationship.62 However, fear, anxiety, and de-
pression are not necessarily indicative of learned helplessness.
Frequent abuse might elicit these emotions without producing learned
helplessness.
In an attempt to further explore learned helplessness, Walker
postulated that certain experiences within the battered woman's child-
hood would predispose her to develop learned helplessness in the bat-
tering relationship.63 She developed a measure she labeled as
childhood learned helplessness (Child LH) based on answers to inter-
view questions about family relationships, childhood experiences (par-
ticularly experiences of violence or sexual abuse), and attitudes in the
home. She examined the relationship of Child LH to a measure of
learned helplessness in the battering relationship (ReI LH) based on
reported battering and the battered woman's reaction to that bat-
tering. She further examined the relationship of Child LH to a mea-
sure of the battered woman's current state (C State) based on indices
of the battered woman's current emotional functioning, including de-
pression, alienation, and self-esteem.64
59. BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 23, at 4748.
60. BATIERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 23, at 96.
61. [d. at 86-89.
62. [d. at 89.
63. [d.
64. [d. at 89-92.
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She found no correlation between Child LH and ReI LH, that is,
no apparent influence by childhood learned helplessness on learned
helplessness in the relationship.65 She found that both Child LH and
ReI LH correlated with C State and that there was no difference in
this relationship between battered women who remained in the bat-
tering relationship and those who had left.66 Walker concluded that
learned helplessness can develop either in childhood or within the bat-
tering relationship.67 Even if one accepts these measures as indicative
of learned helplessness, however, Walker's data refute her expectation
that there are factors within the battered woman's childhood that
make her vulnerable to developing learned helplessness within the
battering relationship, and they are inconsistent with the notion that
learned helplessness determines whether a battered woman leaves the
relationship.
Critics have noted a more salient problem with Walker's reliance
on the concept of learned helplessness as developed by Seligman.68
Having experimentally induced learned helplessness in dogs, research-
ers found it virtually impossible to retrain them to engage in any con-
duct directed at reducing their discomfort or improving their
environment.69 Thus, Seligman's model would not explain how bat-
tered women, if they were suffering from learned helplessness, would
eventually leave the battering relationship or kill their batterers.
Rather, Seligman's work would predict that the battered women
would never leave or take any other action to alter their situation.70 It
would be more consistent with the theoretical and empirical founda-
tions of learned helplessness theory to contend that battered women
who do not kill their batterers suffer learned helplessness and that
battered women who kill their batterers differ from those who do not
precisely because those who kill do not suffer learned helplessness.
Walker found some evidence for the cycle of violence. Sixty-five
percent of the cases in her sample revealed tension building prior to
an acute battering incident. Fifty-eight percent of the cases exhibited
evidence of loving contrition after an acute incident.71 Over time in
the battering relationship, the proportion of tension building in-
creased and the amount of loving contrition decreased.72 Thus, a pos-
sible pay-off for women to remain in the relationship decreased over
time. Walker's data does not reveal, however, whether the tension
building and the loving contrition occurred in the same or different
relationships. She also did not provide any time frame within which
65. Id. at 92.
66. Id. at 94.
67. Id. at 92.
68. Faigman, supra note 44, at 640-41.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 23, at 96-97.
72. Id.
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the cycle was supposed to occur, noting that the tension-building stage
can last for years.73
In summary, Walker's data provided incomplete support for some
and actively undermined other of her hypothesized personality char-
acteristics of battered women. Walker's measures related to learned
helplessness included depression, low self-esteem, external locus of
control, traditional views of women's roles, and fearful rather than
angry emotional responses. Contrary to hypotheses, the data regard-
ing self-esteem, locus of control, and traditional views of women's
roles were not in the expected direction, and her analysis of current
state, relationship, and child learned helplessness revealed minimal
differences between those women who remained in the battering rela-
tionship and those who had left. She found indications of significant
depression, but depression is relatively common in the general popu-
lation, especially among women. Depression is not uniquely indica-
tive of the battered woman syndrome. Collectively, the data and
theoretical foundations of learned helplessness support the proposi-
tion that battered women, and especially battered women who kill
their batterers, do not suffer learned helplessness, at least as well as it
supports the contention that they do. The data included some evi-
dence for parts of the cycle of violence, but provided no clear evi-
dence of the entire cycle as a dominant pattern.
Despite this pattern of data failing to confirm, and in some cases
directly undermining the hypotheses, Walker concluded that the data
supported the cycle of violence and the battered woman syndrome,
and courts and commentators have accepted syndrome testimony as
well established.74 At least one commentator discounts published crit-
icisms of Walker's claims by contending that other sources provide
independent support.75 Other available research, however, provides
no strong support for the proposition that the .battered woman syn-
drome is an accurate description of a syndrome that regularly results
from battering relationships.
2. Further Relevant Research
While research has revealed no studies which test Walker's entire
battered woman syndrome, including depression, low self-esteem,
traditional attitudes toward the female role, external locus of control,
and learned helplessness, studies have addressed various aspects of
the syndrome. A number of methodological problems make compari-
sons across studies difficult. These include varying samples (battered
73. BATIERED WOMAN, supra note 23, at 58.
74. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 380 (N.J. 1984); BATIERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra
note 23, at 101, 147-48; Kinports, supra note 4, at 396-408. Legislatures have also endorsed the
validity and relevance of expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome. See, e.g.,
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107 (West Supp. 1993).
75. Kinports, supra note 4, at 407.
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women in shelters versus battered college students), sample selection
(usually volunteers), lack of control groups in many of the studies, and
widely varying methods of measuring the variables in question (self-
report, clinical interview, objective psychological testing). Even as-
suming that the studies are comparable and measure what they pur-
port to, they do not support the battered woman syndrome as Walker
describes it.
Depression is the component of the battered woman syndrome
that receives the strongest support in these studies, just as it did in
Walker's work. Five of the studies reviewed found battered women to
be depressed on various measures, including self-report and clinical
diagnosis. As indicated by self-report, battered women were more de-
pressed than either nonbattered women with relationship problems76
or women from nonviolent families.77 Also based on self-report, sev-
enty-six percent of battered women interviewed by telephone were
found to be depressed,78 and high levels of depression were found in
battered women residing in a shelter.79 Clinical interview and psychi-
atric diagnosis classified 36.7% of women at a homeless abuse shelter
as suffering Major Depressive Disorder.80
Two studies did not find the expected level of depression in bat-
tered women. One found no difference in depressive symptomology
between battered women and nonabused women in that neither were
depressed, and als'o found that both of those groups were significantly
less depressed than a comparison group of nonbattered women who
were in counseling at the time.8! Objective psychological testing of
another sample of battered women did not find a significant elevation
on the scale measuring depression.82 The studies generally support
the claim that battered women often experience depressive
symptomology at various degrees of severity and particularly that they
see themselves as depressed. As noted previously, however, depres-
sion is common and is not a unique indicator of the battered woman
syndrome.
76. Jacqueline C. Campbell, A Test of Two Explanatory Models of Women's Responses to
Battering, 38 NURSING RES. 18,23 (1989).
77. Peter Jaffe et aI., Emotional and Physical Health Problems ofBattered Women, 31 CAN.
J. PSYCHIATRY 625, 627-28 (1986).
78. Diane R. Follingstad et aI., Factors Moderating Physical and Psychological Symptoms of
Battered Women, 6 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 81, 87 (1991).
79. Roger E. Mitchell & Christine A. Hodson, Coping with Domestic Violence: Social Sup-
port and Psychological Health Among Battered Women, 11 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 629,
640-41 (1983).
80. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 58, at 228-30 (discussing Major Depressive
Disorder); Chole G. West et aI., Psychiatric Disorders ofAbused Women at a Shelter, 61 PSYCHI-
ATRIC Q. 295, 298 (1990).
81. Margaret H. Launius & Bernard L. Jensen, Interpersonal Problem-Solving Skills in Bat-
tered, Counseling, and Control Women, 2 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 151, 158 (1987).
82. Lynne B. Rosewater, Battered or Schizophrenic? Psychological Tests Can't Tell, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 200, 208-09 (Kersti Yllo & Michele Bograd eds. 1988).
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Three studies found low self-esteem for battered women. Bat-
tered women were found to have lower self-esteem than nonbattered
women in the community;83 chronically abused women who remained
in battering relationships were found to have lower self-esteem than
formerly abused women who had left the battering relationships;84
and seventy-six percent of a sample of battered women interviewed by
telephone reported low self-esteem.85 On a possibly related measure
of ego-strength both battered women and women not physically
abused were found to be low, but the battered women scored lower.86
These studies contradict Walker's data which found that battered wo-
men did not rate themselves as having low self-esteem. These sources
of data are difficult to compare because they lack standardization of
measurement, adequate controls, and adequate sample size. The rela-
tionship between depression and low self-esteem calls for investiga-
tion to determine whether the low self-esteem is an artifact of
depression. The only study, aside from Walker's, that assessed both
depression and self-esteem found both depression and low self-esteem
in battered women.87
Battered women do not appear to have more traditional attitudes
towards women's role in society. One study found chronically abused
women to have more traditional attitudes than formerly abused wo-
men,88 while the other found that battered women had fewer tradi-
tional attitudes than women in satisfactory relationships.89
Additionally, it seems intuitively reasonable that people suffering
learned helplessness would perceive their lives as largely controlled by
external forces rather than by their own internal processes. Yet,
Walker's data provides no support for the hypothesis that battered
women experience their lives as controlled by external forces. Chron-
ically battered and formerly battered women scored no differently on
internal locus of control, although battered women did score higher
on control by chance factors. 9o A separate study found that battered
women did not differ from controls and that both scored in the inter-
nal direction on a different measure of locus of control.91 Based on
83. Mitchell & Hodson, supra note 79, at 641.
84. Michael B. Frisch & Cynthia J. MacKenzie, A Comparison ofFormerly and Chronically
Battered Women on Cognitive and Situational Dimensions, 28 PSYCHOTHERAPY ~39, 340 (1991).
85. Margaret L. Trimpey, Self-Esteem and Anxiety: Key Issues in an Abused Women's Sup-
port Group, 10 ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 297, 303 (1989).
86. Barbara Star, Comparing Battered and Non-Battered Women, 3 VICTIMOLOGY: AN
INT'L J. 32,39 (1978).
87. Mitchell & Hodson, supra note 79, at 640-41.
88. Frisch & MacKenzie, supra note 84, at 340.
89. Alan Rosenbaum & K. Daniel O'Leary, Marital Violence; Characteristics of Abusive
Couples, 49 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 63, 67 (1981).
90. Frisch & MacKenzie, supra note 84, at 340.
91. Margaret H. Launius & Carol U. Lindquist, Learned Helplessness, External Locus of
Control, and Passivity in Battered Women, 3 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 307, 314 (1988).
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self-report, a third sample of battered women indicated that they had
equal control in the relationship with the man.92
Studies addressing learned helplessness in battered women have
used significantly different conceptions of learned helplessness than
did Walker. Walker specified situational variables, including battering
incidents and sexual molestation of the battered women, and the af-
fective response of the battered women to the situational variables as
her measures of learned helplessness.93 She also discussed other vari-
ables intuitively related to learned helplessness such as depression,
self-esteem, and locus of control.94 Other studies, in contrast, have
emphasized performance on problem solving tasks as a measure of
learned helplessness. They have evaluated how women respond to
hypothetical vignettes and generate solutions to problem situations.
Four of the studies found that battered women generated fewer solu-
tions and fewer effective solutions to the hypothetical problem situa-
tions than did controls.95 In contrast, another sample of battered
women indicated that they had tried more solutions to their relation-
ship problems than did nonbattered women with unsatisfactory
relationships.96
The relationship between depression and hypothetical problem
solving as a measure of learned helplessness may be important.
Symptoms of Major Depressive Disorder can include slowing of both
physical and cognitive functions.97 Levels of depression less severe
than Major Depressive Disorder could plausibly have similar effects
on the ability to generate solutions to problems. The only study that
explored both depression and problem solving found both depression
and less effective problem-solving skills in battered women.98 This
finding is consistent with the interpretation of the results in these
problem solving studies as indicative of depression.
Intuitively, it would seem that assertiveness would have some rel-
evance to the notion of learned helplessness. Assertive behavior
would seem inconsistent with the notion that battered women view
themselves as unable to influence their environment. Battered wo-
men have been found to be no different from controls or norms on
general assertion although they are less assertive in the relationship
92. Campbell, supra note 76, at 23.
93. BATIERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 23, at 89-91.
94. BATIERED WOMAN, supra note 23, at 45-51.
95. Susan Claerhout et aI., Problem-Solving Skills of Rural Battered Women, 10 AM. J.
COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 605, 610 (1982); Jerry Finn, The Stresses and Coping Behavior ofBattered
Women, Soc. CASEWORK: J. CONTEMP. Soc. WORK, June 1985, at 341, 346; Launius & Jensen,
supra note 81, at 158; Launius & Lindquist, supra note 91, at 313.
96. Campbell, supra note 76, at 23.
97. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 58, at 218-24.
98. Lanius & Jensen, supra note 81, at 158-59.
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with the batterer.99 The latter might have some survival value, given
that assertion could be seen as provocative by the batterer.
3. Summary
Neither Walker's data nor the later studies sufficiently support
the battered woman syndrome as a pattern regularly produced by bat-
tering relationships. Some evidence supports the contention that bat-
tered women suffer from depression and anxiety. Moreover, less
evidence supports the contention that they experience lower self-es-
teem, and have difficulty with certain types of problem-solving tasks.
Quite possibly, however, depression can account for both the low self-
esteem and difficulty with problem solving. The data provide no sup-
port for the contentions that battered women have traditional atti-
tudes toward the female role in society nor that they demonstrate
external locus of control. Battered women also appeared to function
in the normal range of assertiveness, although not in the battering re-
lationship itself. None of these studies evaluated Walker's cycle of
violence. Taken collectively, the currently available data do not justify
the claim that the battered woman syndrome, as usually formulated,
provides a general portrait of those who have suffered battering
.relationships.
The data provide substantial support for the contention that bat-
tered women suffer significant depression and anxiety.lOO This ele-
vated level of distress may resemble the pattern of distress suffered by
others who experience various types of trauma or ongoing stress. lOl
The argument for expert testimony regarding the battered woman
syndrome does not rest, however, on the claim that battered women
suffer distress. Rather, it requires that battered women typically suf-
fer a particular syndrome, specific to battered women, that carries
special significance for self-defense.lo2 The presence of depression,
anxiety, or a general distress syndrome does not substantiate this
claim.
Perhaps most importantly from the perspective of the criminal
courts, learned helplessness has been the aspect of the battered wo-
man syndrome most frequently cited as central to cases of self-defense
by battered women, yet it draws very little support from the available
99. Frisch & MacKenzie, supra note 84, at 340; Launius & Lindquist, supra note 91, at 314;
Rosenbaum & O'Leary, supra note 89, at 67; Star, supra note 86, at 41.
100. See generally, Elaine Hilberman & Kit Munson, Sixty Battered Women, 2 VIC-
TIMOLOGY: AN INT'L J. 460 (1977-78); Elaine Hilberman, Overview: The "Wife-Beater's Wife"
Reconsidered, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1336 (1980); Beth M. Houskamp & David W. Foy, The
Assessment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Battered Women, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
367 (1991); West et aI., supra note 80.
101. Hilberman & Munson, supra note 100, at 1341 (discussing battered women as suffering
a distress syndrome expected following intense and traumatic stress).
102. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text (discussing the putative significance of
the battered woman syndrome for self-defense).
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data. The complete body of work provides neither any clear concep-
tion of learned helplessness nor any good reason to believe that it
regularly occurs in battered women. Some factors that seem intui-
tively related to learned helplessness, such as decreased self-esteem
and problem-solving skills, are supported by some sources but not by
others. In addition, the studies consistently report elevated depres-
sion which may account for these factors. The data consistently fails
to support other intuitively plausible indicators of learned helpless-
ness, including traditional gender roles and external locus of control.
Collectively, the data reviewed supports the proposition that battered
women do not suffer learned helplessness, at least as well as it sup-
ports the claim that they do. Finally, it would be more consistent with
the theoretical and empirical foundations of learned helplessness to
contend that battered women who kill their batterers differ from
those who remain in the battering relationships without killing their
batterers precisely because those who kill do not manifest learned
helplessness.103
This review does not preclude the possibilities that one or more
types of battered woman syndrome do occur, nor that future studies
will provide strong supporting evidence for such a syndrome. For this
reason, the following sections of this article assume for the sake of
argument that such evidence is forthcoming, and they examine the sig-
nificance for self-defense by battered women of a battered woman
syndrome roughly similar to that usually formulated by the courts and
commentators. These sections argue, however, that the battered wo-
man syndrome bears almost no relevance to these cases.
III. THE RELEVANCE OF THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME TO
SELF-DEFENSE
A. Reasonable Belief in the Necessity of Force
1. Imminence or Immediacy
Battered women who exercise force in nonconfrontation situa-
tions encounter a threshold difficulty in providing grounds for a rea-
sonable belief that any force was necessary. Most jurisdictions allow
self-defense only when necessary to prevent the imminent or immedi-
ate use of unlawful force. 104 Some courts and commentators contend
that rules requiring an immediate attack create an unfair disadvantage
for battered women or for women generally because the reasonable-
ness of the force exercised by these defendants arises from their his-
tory with their batterers, but the requirement of an immediate, as
opposed to imminent, attack does not allow consideration of these
103. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
104. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 15, § 5.7(d); ROBINSON, supra note 15, § 131(c).
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factors. For this reason they advocate provisions requiring imminence
rather than immediacy.105
This putative distinction regarding relevance of past experience
does not characterize the ordinary meanings of "immediate" and "im-
minence." In ordinary language, both terms refer to the latency be-
tween the present and a forthcoming event, and neither addresses the
relevance of past events for any judgment of that latency. "Imminent"
means "impending threateningly ... ready to befall or overtake one;
close at hand in its incidence ... coming on shortly."106 "Immediate"
means "present or next adjacent ... occurring, accomplished, or tak-
ing effect without delay or lapse of time."107 Both terms describe a
relationship between the present and some future event that either
occurs instantaneously or follows very shortly. "Imminent" suggests
an ominous tone and arguably allows slightly longer latency than "im-
mediate," but both are silent as to the relevance of past events.
Legal authorities define and use these two terms in a manner con-
sistent with ordinary language. Black's Law Dictionary defines "im-
mediate" as "present, at once; without delay," and it defines
"imminent" as "near at hand; mediate rather than immediate; im-
pending; on the point of happening; threatening; menacing."lo8 As
with the ordinary language meanings, both terms generally refer to
the relationship between the present and some future event, and "im-
minent" seems to allow somewhat more latency than "immediate."
Black's Law Dictionary specifically defines the meaning of "imminent
danger" for purposes of homicide in self-defense in a manner that ren-
ders the two terms interchangeable. For that purpose, an "imminent
danger" is an "immediate danger, such as must be instantly met.,,109
Courts sometimes use "imminent" and "immediate" interchangea-
bly,no and when interpreting self-defense provisions using either term
have accepted evidence of past history as relevant.111 In short,
although some courts and commentators have attributed significance
to the selection of "imminent" or "immediate," neither ordinary nor
legal usage supports this attribution when the two terms are accu-
rately interpreted. Therefore, the remainder of this article uses these
terms interchangeably.
105. State v. Hodges 716 P.2d 563, 570-71 (Kan. 1986); Maguigan, supra note 1, at 449-50.
106. I OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1380 (Compact ed. 1971).
107. Id. at 960.
108. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 749, 750 (6th ed. 1990).
109. Id. at 750.
110. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 385 n.23 (N.J. 1984); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13
(N.C. 1989).
111. State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268, 1270 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) ("immediate"); State v.
Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 314-15 (Wash. 1984) ("imminent").
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2. Imminent or Immediately Necessary-The Justificatory
Foundation
Although the choice between "imminent" and "immediate" ar-
guably carries no significance, courts and commentators sometimes
overlook a related and more substantive distinction. Black's defini-
tion of an "imminent danger" as an "immediate danger, such as must
be instantly met" suggests two different relationships. "Immediate
danger" suggests the relationship discussed previously between the
time an individual exercises defensive force and the time they expect
the harm defended against to occur. The suggestion is that the unlaw-
ful aggression must be present or impending when the defensive force
is used. In contrast, "such as must be instantly met" addresses the
relationship between the time the defensive force is exercised and the
time at which it must be exercised in order to prevent the threatened
harm. In many cases, these relationships are interchangeable for prac-
tical purposes because the immediacy of the expected harm renders
immediate the need to exercise defensive force. That is, X must shoot
Y now rather than calling the police because Y is about to stab X.
In unusual circumstances, however, these relationships may di-
verge because force may be necessary now to prevent harm that will
occur in the more distant future. Consider, for example, the case of
the hikers X and Y who engage in a ten-day race across the desert.
The only source of water in the desert is a single water hole approxi-
mately half way to the finish line. Each hiker must carry a five to six
day supply of water and replenish the supply at the water hole in or-
der to survive the race. During the first few days, X catches Y at-
tempting to sabotage X by changing trail markers and attempting to
steal X's compass and water. If successful, each of these efforts would
have caused X to die in the desert.
As day five begins, both hikers are almost out of water and must
replenish their supplies the next day at the water hole. As Y passes X
on the trail on the morning of the fifth day, Y holds up a box of rat
poison and says to X, "I'll get you this time; I'll beat you to the water
hole, get my water, and poison the rest; You'll never get out of here
alive." Both hikers walk all day, but due to a sprained ankle, X can
barely keep up with Y. That evening, as X is forced to stop due to the
sprained ankle and exhaustion, Y says "I'll walk all night and get to
the water hole before morning." As Y begins to walk away, X, who is
unable to continue that night, says "wait," but Y walks in the direction
of the water hole. X shoots Y, convinced by Y's prior threats and
sabotage that this is the only way to prevent Y from poisoning the
water hole the next morning.
Y poses no immediate threat to X because Y will not poison the
water until the next morning, and X will not suffer the fatal conse-
quences of the act until a day or two later. Thus, even stipulating that
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X can prevent Y from killing X only by shooting Y, a statute limiting
self-defense to circumstances threatening imminent harm would not
include X's force within the scope of the defense. By requiring that
the defensive force be "immediately necessary" rather than that the
expected unlawful aggression be immediate or imminent, the Model
Penal Code accommodates these cases and adopts a standard address-
ing the relation between the time the defensive force is exercised and
the time at which it must be used in order to prevent the unlawful
harmYz
Although the desert hiker case may seem somewhat fanciful,
some battered women may encounter realistic circumstances in which
this distinction becomes critical. Assume for the sake of argument
that some battered women can accurately predict forthcoming vio-
lence from their batterers who are not currently aggressing and that
these battered women will be unable to defend themselves or secure
assistance at the time of the future attack.H3 Given these assump-
tions, for the battered women to prevent the forthcoming unlawful
harm by the batterers, defensive force in the form of a "preemptive
strike" may be immediately necessary during a period when battering
is not imminent because the batterers are asleep, distracted, or too
intoxicated to attacky4
The central question involves the appropriate relationship be-
tween the necessity and imminence requirements. A standard al-
lowing defensive force only when immediately necessary to prevent
unlawful harm treats imminence of harm as a factor regarding neces-
sity. That is, the defensive force is justified only if necessary to pre-
vent an unlawful harm, and the imminence of that unlawful harm
contributes to, but does not completely determine, the judgment of
necessity. In unusual circumstances such as those confronted by the
desert hiker or by some battered women, defensive force may be im-
mediately necessary to prevent unlawful harm, although that harm is
not yet imminent. In these cases, imminence of harm does not serve
as a decisive factor in the determination of necessity. A standard al-
lowing defensive force only when necessary to prevent an imminent
harm, in contrast, treats imminence of harm as an independent re-
quirement for justified force in that the force must be necessary and
the unlawful harm must be immediately forthcoming. Such a standard
does not allow defensive force necessary to prevent delayed unlawful
112. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 16, § 3.04(1); LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 15,
§ 5.7(d).
113. See infra notes 126-233 and accompanying text for a discussion of these assumptions.
114. Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: /I-Honest but Unreasonable Mistake of
Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. REV. 459, 480,497 n.212 (discussing briefly earlier "preemptive
strike" cases).
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aggression, even if the present situation represents the last opportu-
nity to prevent such harmYs
Given the assumptions stated previously, some battered women
defendants fall within the parameters of justified self-defense as mea-
sured by standards treating imminence of harm as a factor relevant to
necessity but not under standards requiring necessity and imminent
harm separately. Legislatures and courts must select one of these re-
lationships between necessity and imminence of harm in adopting and
interpreting legal rules. The justification for allowing the exercise of
force in self-defense should inform this choice.
Several principles and policies arguably support self-defense pro-
visions. A complete review of self-defense theory would extend well
beyond the scope of this project, but each theory offers some justifica-
tion for allowing innocent victims the use of at least the degree of
force necessary to prevent culpable aggressors from causing them a
comparable degree of harmy6 Dominant theories appeal to the so-
cial interests in minimizing harm, protecting the legal order, or favor-
ing right over wrong. Some writers, for example, justify self-defense
as minimizing social harm when the interests of assailants are appro-
priately discounted as compared to those of innocent partiesy7
Others interpret self-defense as a legal device that allows individuals
to protect their autonomy and the legal order by preventing illegal
assaults when institutional enforcement is not available. By doing so,
they correct circumstances in which right would otherwise have to
yield to wrong.118
Due to the general social policies against the private use of force
and causing unnecessary harm, each of these theories limits justified
self-defense to those circumstances in which it is necessary to achieve
the justifying goal or to protect the underlying principle. Thus, one
can exercise defensive force to minimize harm or protect the social
order only when no nonviolent alternative will achieve that end. This
necessity requirement is consistent with each proffered justification
for self-defense, and indeed, some writers interpret necessity as the
core of self-defense doctrineY9 Imminence of harm remains consis-
tent with this theoretical foundation when it serves as a factor regard-
ing judgments of necessity because in most circumstances the
judgment that no nonviolent alternative will suffice is more likely to
115. Robinson argues that necessity entails immediacy, rendering any mention of immi-
nence superfluous. ROBINSON, supra note 15, § 131(c)(l) & (2). Unfortunately, statutes and
common-law rules do not ordinarily recognize this insight.
116.' See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 15, § 5.7; ROBINSON, supra note 15, §§ 131-32; Rob-
ert F. Schopp, Self-Defense: A Theory a Liberal Can Live With, in IN HARM'S WAY (Jules Cole-
man & Allen Buchanan eds., forthcoming 1994).
117. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.5.2 (1978); ROBINSON, supra
note 15, § 131(a).
118. FLETCHER, supra note 117, §§ 10.5.3-.4; Schopp, supra note 116.
119. FLETCHER, supra note 117, § 10.5; ROBINSON, supra note 15, § 131(c).
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be accurate regarding an imminent harm than a remote one. Immi-
nence of harm can undermine these justificatory theories, however, if
it is accepted as an independent requirement of the defense.
Consider, for example, the desert hiker case discussed previously.
A statute barring X, the victim of the initial aggression, from exercis-
ing immediately necessary force in self-defense because the harm was
not yet imminent would protect the culpable Y at the expense of the
innocent X, sacrificing an innocent life and protecting the culpable
party. This result would constitute a greater social harm rather than a
lesser one when the interests of the culpable party are appropriately
discounted. Similarly, X would acquiesce in a felony, allowing disrup-
tion of the social order, and right would give way to wrong because
Y's wrongful conduct would violate X's legitimate claim. In short, im-
minence of harm can promote the underlying justifications of self-de-
fense when it serves as a factor to be considered in making judgments
of necessity, but it can undermine those justifications if it is accepted
as an independent requirement in addition to necessity. For these rea-
sons, the Model Penal Code and some commentators advocate some
variation of the "immediately necessary" formulation rather than "ne-
cessity and imminence."12o
3. Learned Helplessness as Disordered Thought and Special
Capacity
Immediate necessity, not imminence of harm, should be consid-
ered essential to self-defense claims, including those asserted by bat-
tered women. According to this interpretation, battered women
defendants can justify the exercise of defensive force in nonconfronta-
tion cases if they can demonstrate the ability to accurately perceive
when that force becomes immediately necessary to prevent a future
attack. Courts and commentators have advocated expert testimony
regarding the battered woman syndrome for this purpose.121
Surprisingly, courts and commentators tend to emphasize the sig-
nificance of learned helplessness both as a distortion of perception
and thought and as a special capacity that renders these women's be-
liefs reasonable by enabling them to accurately predict future attacks
in the absence of overt cues recognizable to most people.122 One
120. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 16, § 3.04(1); LAFAVE'& SCOTT, supra note 15,
§ 5.7(d). This article does not address considerations of error preference which might apply with
particular significance to deadly force. See Schopp, supra note 116.
121. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 177 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Lenore Walker as
advocating this position); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (N.J. 1984) (describing the battered
woman as particularly able to predict violence); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1985) (describing "acute discriminatory powers" regarding danger); Kinports, supra
note 4, at 416, 423-26 (indicating that a reasonable battered woman can perceive imminent dan-
ger when husband is sleeping).
122. Compare State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 567 (Kan. 1986) (describing battered women as
terror stricken people whose mental state is distorted, as brainwashed and disturbed persons)
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court, for example, described those suffering from the battered wo-
man syndrome as "unable to think clearly" and as suffering "emo-
tional paralysis" and the "delusion that things will improve."123 This
court also concluded, however, that evidence of the syndrome should
be admitted because it would enable the jury to understand the de-
fendant's "acute discriminatory powers" as relevant to her justifica-
tory claim of self-defense.124
These sources appeal to the putative special predictive capacity to
support the claim that defendants who exercise force in the apparent
absence of explicit signs of imminent danger do so with a reasonable
belief that the defensive force is immediately necessary. According to
this reasoning, although an average juror might not perceive the dan-
ger in these situations as described in court, the defendants reasonably
and accurately perceived the forthcoming danger and the immediate
necessity of defensive violence by virtue of their special capacities.
The paradox arises from the apparent tension in describing those
who suffer from the· battered woman syndrome in a manner sug-
gesting that the syndrome distorts their perceptions and judgment re-
garding the battering relationship yet simultaneously provides them
with a special capacity to predict events within that relationship with
superior accuracy. The mere fact that people suffer certain impair-
ments of perception, thought, or judgment does not preclude the pos-
sibility that they might also possess superior capacities for specified
tasks. The account of the battered woman syndrome as including both
impairment and special capacities seems particularly awkward, how-
ever, because both involve the accuracy of the battered woman's judg-
ments about the batterer and the battering relationship. At least at
first glance, the description of learned helplessness apparently under-
mines the reasonableness of any beliefs these defendants might have
about the batterers or their relationships. In what manner does expert
testimony about the syndrome, with the impairment identified as
learned helplessness, support the claim that these defendants possess
a special capacity that grounds reasonable beliefs about forthcoming
violence?
with id. at 569 (describing battered women as particularly able to accurately predict abuse);
compare Kelly, 478 A.2d at 364, 372 (describing the battered woman syndrome as producing
psychological paralysis and the belief that the batterer is omnipotent) with id. at 378 (describing
battered women as particularly able to predict abuse accurately). See generally Kinports, supra
note 4, at 416-22 (discussing the dispute regarding the notion that battered women suffer a syn-
drome that renders their beliefs more accurate and reasonable).
123. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
124. Id. at 362.
No.1] BATIERED WOMAN SYNDROME 71
4. The Battered Woman Syndrome or the Pattern of Battering as
Supporting Reasonable Belief
Assume a particular battered woman does not suffer from the
battered woman syndrome. She has experienced an extended bat-
tering relationship, but she has not developed the pattern of psycho-
logical characteristics such as depression, decreased self-esteem, and
learned helplessness that constitute the syndrome assumed to have
been established for the purpose of this section. This battered woman
kills her batterer as he sleeps in a drunken stupor because she fears
that he will attack her severely when he regains consciousness. She
might plausibly argue that she reasonably believed she would be in
severe danger when he awoke because she recognized a pattern of
speech and conduct that preceded previous severe beatings. She
might contend that the beatings have escalated over the past few
months concurrent with his escalating alcohol consumption. She
could further testify that she has learned to keep track of his drinking
because the beatings have increased in intensity in proportion to the
amount he drank and that on the day in question, he had just drunk
more than she had ever seem him drink in one day.
Alternately, she might provide a much less specific explanation.
She might testify that she killed him as he slept because she felt very
frightened when he threatened her before he passed out. She has
learned to trust her fear, she testifies, because the intensity of the
beatings often seemed to reflect the intensity of fear she felt when he
threatened her. "I don't know how I can tell," she testifies, "but when
I started to shake like that, I always knew it would turn out real bad."
This defendant's testimony presents a plausible claim of reason-
able belief on the basis of her extended experience with the bat-
terer.J2s Although the more precise explanation based on the amount
he drank and the pattern of escalation provides a more detailed ac-
count of the origins of her belief, the second variation based only on
the intensity of her fear and her experience of severe abuse following
more intense fear does not seem implausible. Many people who have
lived with another for an extended period learn to recognize or pre-
dict the other's moods or conduct without being able to articulate an
explanation.
This defendant has experienced an extended pattern of battering
and puts forward a plausible claim of reasonable belief that an attack
was forthcoming, but her evidence for this claim makes no reference
to the battered woman syndrome or any of its components. Her claim
is plausible, though not obviously persuasive, and any competent at-
torney would prefer to support it with additional evidence. Expert
testimony regarding the syndrome, however, would not necessarily
125. Here we address only the belief that an attack was coming, not the issue of legal alter-
natives to defensive force which is discussed infra notes 140-233 and accompanying text.
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support the defendant's story. As described, this defendant does not
suffer from the battered woman syndrome. If she did, an expert could
testify that she suffered depression, decreased self-esteem, and
learned helplessness, but this testimony would not support the conten-
tion that she reasonably believed an attack forthcoming because these
characteristics do not increase the reliability of her beliefs or the accu-
racy of her predictions.
Her testimony is plausible not because it is associated with a
clinical syndrome but because it describes an ordinary pattern of in-
ductive inference familiar to most people. She reasoned from her
prior experience with this person in similar circumstances to an infer-
ence regarding his likely conduct the following morning. Although
individual behavior is difficult to predict, the best indicators of future
violence are past violent behavior by the same person in similar
circumstances.126
Additional physical evidence or testimony confirming her ac-
count would render it more persuasive. Emergency room records
might confirm her claim of escalating violence by documenting in-
creasing severity of injuries, for example, or neighbors might testify
that her husband had been drinking more heavily recently. Family or
friends might be able to testify that they had observed suspicious inju-
ries that seemed to be associated with increased distress. Each of
these sources of evidence would confirm her account of the batterer's
past conduct, supporting her inference regarding his expected behav-
ior. Compelling evidence confirming her description of his past pat-
tern of behavior in similar circumstances would render her belief
regarding the forthcoming attack very reasonable because it would
provide exactly the kind of information that ordinary people like the
jurors usually rely on in drawing inferences about the likely behavior
of other people.
This kind of supporting evidence, however, may not be available
for defendants who have lived in isolation from friends, families, and
medical care. Similarly, those who have successfully concealed the
pattern of past abuse from others may not have access to such evi-
dence. These defendants would find it difficult to establish their belief
as reasonable because they would have difficulty confirming the oc-
currence of the series of past events from which they drew their infer-
ence regarding the anticipated attack.
Testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome would not
cure this problem, however, because it would describe the defendant's
psychological characteristics rather than the series of events that serve
to render her inference reasonable. To the extent that expert testi-
mony emphasizes learned helplessness, it portrays the battered wo-
man as unable to accurately perceive and evaluate the batterer, the
126. JOHN MONAHAN, PREDlcrING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 88-92,104-05 (1981).
No.1] BATIERED WOMAN SYNDROME 73
relationship, and her options, actively undermining the contention
that her beliefs regarding these issues were reasonable. Such testi-
mony tends to portray her beliefs as the. product of the type of psycho-
logical impairment known as learned helplessness rather than as a
product of past experience which the jury recognizes as providing
good reasons for a belief.127
In short, some battered women may well be able to predict forth-
coming abuse with sufficient accuracy to support a reasonable belief,
but these beliefs are the product of neither a special capacity nor the
battered w9man syndrome. They reflect an ordinary process of induc-
tive inference from past behavior in similar circumstances. The appro-
priate supporting evidence involves confirmation of this past behavior,
enabling the jury to draw the same reasonable inference. Thus, the
critical evidence establishes the past pattern of battering rather than
the battered woman syndrome. Although not always available, this
type of evidence supports the required inferences, and lawyers, jurors,
and courts are familiar with it and likely to understand it.
5. Reasonable Belief in the Necessity of Deadly Force
To establish self-defense, the battered woman who kills her bat-
terer in a nonconfrontation situation must demonstrate not only that
she reasonably believed an attack was forthcoming but also that she
reasonably believed that deadly force was necessary and proportion-
ate to the impending assault. Standard self-defense doctrine allows
the exercise of deadly force only when such force is necessary to pre-
vent another from using unlawful deadly force' against the actor,128
Deadly force means force likely to cause death or serious bodily in-
jury.129 An extended series of cases recognizes considerations such as
size, gender, and past history with the assailant as relevant to the rea-
sonableness of the decision to exercise deadly force in self-defense.
The belief that deadly force was necessary must have been reasonable
in light of the information available to the defendant at the time she
acted.130
A defendant who has experienced an extended battering relation-
ship involving serious bodily injury has reasonable grounds to believe
that if an attack is forthcoming, it is likely to include the danger of
127. See infra notes 244-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the appropriate inter-
pretation of "reasonableness."
128. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 16, § 3.04(2)(b); LAFAVE & Scon, supra note 15,
§§ 5.7(a) & (b).
129. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 16, § 3.11(2); LAFAVE & Scon, supra note 15,
§ 5.7(a).
130. Smith v. United States, 161 U.S. 85, 88 (1896); State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 571 (Kan.
1986); Kress v. State, 144 S.W.2d 735, 738-39 (Tenn. 1940); State v. Painter, 620 P.2d 1001, 1004
(Wash. Ct. App. 1980); Maguigan, supra note I, at 416-23.
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serious injury.131 Thus, by establishing her reasonable beliefs that an
attack was forthcoming and that past attacks by this batterer have in-
cluded conduct likely to inflict serious bodily injury, the defendant
demonstrates the basis for a reasonable belief that deadly force is pro-
portionate to the threat. If in addition, the defendant's experience
provides her with a basis to believe that due to factors such as size,
gender, or physical disadvantage she can prevent the batterer from
causing her serious bodily injury only by exercising deadly force, then
she reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary.
Analogous reasoning applies in confrontation cases in which the
defendant exercises deadly force which is apparently disproportionate
to the attack. In these cases the defendant can establish a reasonable
belief that defensive force was necessary by presenting evidence that
an attack occurred and alternatives were not available, but she may
encounter difficulty supporting a reasonable belief that deadly force
was necessary and justified if the attack in progress included only
nondeadly force. If a battered woman has experienced a pattern of
battering in which nondeadly force has escalated during the abuse,
however, that history in conjunction with the occurrent nondeadly at-
tack provides a basis for a reasonable belief that deadly force is forth-
coming. She can support a reasonable belief in the necessity of
exercising deadly defensive force, therefore, by presenting evidence of
the occurrent nondeadly force, the past pattern of escalation, and the
lack of safe alternatives.132 Although case law allows evidence of the
defendant's past pattern of battering by the batterer to establish rea-
sonable belief in the necessity of deadly force regarding either the
confrontation or nonconfrontation situations, we directly address the
nonconfrontation cases as the most problematic for the defendants.l33
A critic might advocate admitting expert testimony regarding the
battered woman syndrome in these cases on the following basis. Evi-
dence of past battering sufficient to support the battered woman's ex-
ercise of deadly force in the circumstances would describe severe and
repetitive abuse. Thus, it would elicit highly emotional reactions from
many ordinary people, including jurors.134 For this reason, some
courts might preclude such evidence as relevant but inadmissible be-
cause highly prejudicia1.135 Expert testimony regarding the syndrome,
131. Kress, 144 S.W.2d at 738-39 (recognizing the history of battering by the batterer and
the size and gender of the parties as relevant to the justification of the defendant's resorting to
deadly force).
132. This reasoning accepts for the sake of argument the proportionality requirement as a
legitimate constraint on self-defense. For an argument that it is at best a concession to error
preference, see Schopp, supra note 116.
133. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (citing authority regarding the relevance of
the defendant's history with the assailant).
134. See, e.g., State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268, 1271-72 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Nor-
man, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9-11 (N.C. 1989). Both cases describe egregious patterns of abuse.
135. JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 779 (4th ed. 1992).
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should be admitted, such a critic might contend, as the only available
means of making the admittedly relevant evidence of past abuse avail-
able to the jury.
The response to such a critic has three parts. First, a well-estab-
lished exception to the general rule against character evidence allows
evidence regarding past aggression by the victim in homicide cases
when there is controversy regarding who initiated the aggression.136
This exception, in conjunction with the relevance of the battered wo-
man's past history with the batterer to her reasonable belief in neces-
sity, supp<?rts the admissibility of such evidence. Second, not all
courts currently accept the argument presented in this article. As in-
dicated previously, the purpose here is to demonstrate that the basic
principles underlying widely accepted self-defense doctrine support
the contention that courts should allow argument and evidence on the
basis endorsed here.
Third, the relative weight of the probative value and prejudicial
effect will vary from case to case. If the former outweighs the latter in
a particular case, then this evidence of past abuse should be admitted
for the reasons already stated. If the prejudicial effect outweighs the
probative value in a particular case, then the evidence would not be
admissible, but calling it part of a battered woman syndrome renders
it no less prejudicial and no more probative. Thus, in each case, either
the evidence should be admitted under ordinary law or it should be
precluded as overly prejudicial. Either conclusion depends on the rel-
ative weight of the probative and prejudicial effects of the evidence of
past abuse without regard to the battered woman syndrome.
6. Retreat as a Legal Alternative to Defensive Force
The availability of safe legal alternatives to defensive force under-
mines the claim that the exercise of deadly defensive force was neces-
sary. If victims of impending unlawful force can protect themselves
through retreat or recourse to institutional resources such as police or
the courts, then the private use of force is not necessary.137 In some
circumstances, escape from the dangerous situation provides an alter-
native means of avoiding the threatened injury. This alternative
rarely applies in confrontation cases because jurisdictions requiring
retreat limit this duty to circumstances in which one can retreat in
safety, and only in rare circumstances would one be able to retreat in
safety during an attack.138
The opportunity to retreat can undermine the claim that defen-
sive force is strictly necessary in nonconfrontation cases because the
136. [d. § 193.
137. LAFAVE & SCOTf, supra note IS, § 5.7(a).
138. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 16, § 3.04(2)(b)(ii); LAFAVE & SCOTf, supra note 15,
§ 5.7(f).
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defendant with the opportunity to retreat before an attack begins may
be able to avoid the threat of harm without exercising force. In the
majority of jurisdictions, however, innocent individuals have no duty
to avoid using force in self-defense if doing so would require that they
retreat from a place in which they have a right to stay. Of the minor-
ity of jurisdictions that enforce a general duty to retreat before exer-
cising force or deadly force in self-defense, most recognize a dwelling
exception allowing deadly force without retreat by those who are at-
tacked in their homes.139 Thus, the dispute regarding whether the bat-
tered woman syndrome renders the defendant unable to exercise the
alternative of retreat is irrelevant to cases that occur in the home. Re-
gardless of whether she could retreat, there is no legal reason why she
should do so before using defensive force. Ordinary self-defense doc-
trine allows one to exercise defensive force, including deadly force, in
one's own home when one has no safe alternative except retreat.
7. Institutional Legal Alternatives
Available legal alternatives other than retreat may preclude the
justified use of force in self-defense. Institutional assistance (for ex-
ample, police intervention or restraining orders) undermines the claim
that defensive force is necessary provided that assistance is available
and effective. Confrontation cases involving an attack in progress
would rarely offer an opportunity to resort to these options, but the
availability of legal alternatives may become a critical consideration in
nonconfrontation cases. The defendant who 'exercises violence
against a batterer who is not battering her at that time must explain
why her exercise of force was necessary to prevent an anticipated at-
tack. To support the claim that she reasonably believed that her exer-
cise of force was necessary for self-defense, she must demonstrate that
she reasonably believed that these legal alternatives were either un-
available or ineffective.
Data supports this belief as both reasonable and accurate in at
least some cases. The history of institutional failure to effectively in-
tervene in ongoing battering relationships has been well documented
elsewhere.14o This article addresses only the evidence regarding the
current status of such legal alternatives.
Criminal prosecution and civil protective orders provide appro-
priate legal responses to battery. Effective intervention through
139. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 15, § 5.7(f). Although a few jurisdictions recognize an
exception to this exception when the assailant is a cohabitant of the dwelling, most do not.
140. See, e.g., ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL (1987); Stephen E.
Brown, Police Responses to Wife Beating: Neglect of a Crime of Violence, 12 J. CRIM. JUST. 277
(1984); Loraine P. Eber, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed, 32 HASTINGS
L.J. 895 (1981); Amy Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Consti-
tution Help Them When Police Won't?, 95 YALE L.J. 788 (1986); Barbara Finesmith, Police Re-
sponse to Battered Women: A Critique and Proposals for Reform, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 74
(1983); Kinports, supra note 4.
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either type of legal action requires that a series of legal actors imple-
ment the appropriate substantive law. Criminal prosecution is sepa-
rate and distinct from a civil protective order, and in all states except
New York, a victim of domestic assault may pursue the former while
concurrently seeking the latter. l4l Physical assault or threat of assault
constitutes a criminal offense in every state, regardless of whether a
relationship exists between the victim and assailant. Many additional
forms of domestic violence, including sexual assault, destruction or
theft of property, kidnapping, and involuntary confinement, violate
criminal prohibitions. The victim of such conduct may initiate a crimi-
nal complaint in the proper office.142 However, a battered woman is
far more likely to become involved in the criminal justice system
through the intervention of the police department in her jurisdiction.
a. Police Response
Often, police officers are the only arm of the legal system imme-
diately available to the battered woman, because most domestic vio-
lence occurs in the evening hours and on weekends.143 Domestic
disturbance incidents constitute the largest volume of calls received by
police departments each year.144 Police dispatchers,145 and individual
officers,146 make critical determinations regarding which calls elicit a
response. Individual battered women have attempted to hold police
departments accountable under 42 V.S.c. § 1983 for failing to respond
to their calls for help.147 Some sources explain that police hesitancy to
141. NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS LEGISLATION, CURRENT
COURT PRACTICE AND ENFORCEMENT (1990).
142. Lisa G. Lerman & Naomi R. Cahn, Legal Issues in Violence Toward Adults, in CASE
STUDIES IN FAMILY VIOLENCE 73, 79 (Robert T. Ammerman & Michael Hersen eds., 1991).
143. ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, LEGAL REFORM EFFORTS TO ASSIST BATTERED WOMEN:
PAST PRESENT AND FUTURE 40 (1990).
144. CLARE CORNELL & ROGER LANGLEY, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES 131 (1985).
145. In one study, police dispatchers were found to underreport the violence faced by the
battered woman. Nan Oppenlander, Coping or Copping Out: Police in Domestic Disputes, 20
VICTIMOLOGY 449 (1982).
146. Police officers may choose not to respond to domestic disturbance calls because they
believe such incidents are personal matters and police intervention will only make matters
worse. James Walter, Police in the Middle: A Study ofSmall City Police Intervention in Domestic
Disputes, 9 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 248, 253 (1981).
147. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding battered
woman alleged sufficient facts to withstand motion for summary judgment on equal protection
claim against police for treating domestic assault cases less seriously than other forms of assault);
Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding battered woman alleged
sufficient facts to withstand motion for summary judgment on her equal protection claim against
the city for treating domestic violence calls as less serious than other assault incidents); Dudosh
v. City of Allentown, 665 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Pa.), reconsideration denied, 668 F. Supp. 944 (E.D.
Pa.), vacated, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. Pa.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 942 (1988) (holding battered
woman alleged sufficient facts to withstand motion for summary judgment on equal protection
claims against police for adhering to classification system which distinguished between domestic
violence and other assault cases); Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp. 574 (W.D. Mich.
1986) (holding battered woman alleged sufficient facts to withstand motion for summary judg-
ment as to equal protection claim against a police office which failed to respond to her call and
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respond to these calls stems from officers' perceptions that domestic
disturbance calls involve a high risk of injury and death.l48 Current
statistics reveal, however, that only five percent of felonious deaths to
officers occur while answering domestic calls, making such calls one of
the least frequent types of incidents involved in police injuries.149
Police officers who respond to a domestic disturbance call must
decide whether the situation merits an arrest. Historically, state stat-
utes prohibited arrests in misdemeanor cases unless the violation oc-
curred in the presence of an officer. Therefore, officers frequently
could not make a warrantless arrest unless a felony had occurred.150
By 1983, twenty-eight states had legislation that allowed police to
make warrantless arrests in cases of domestic assault where officers
had probable cause to believe batterers had committed misdemeanor
assaults.151 Only Alabama and West Virginia remained without such
legislation by 1988.152
Although legislation authorizing the arrest of men who batter is
often discretionary, fifteen states require that police arrest the of-
fender in a domestic violence incident.153 Mandatory arrest provisions
have sometimes resulted in police arresting the battered woman as
well as the batterer.154 Some states have amended their statutes to
provide for arrest of the "primary aggressor."155 In addition to the
above legislative measures, nineteen states require police to arrest if
the batterer has violated a protective order.156
against the chief of police for allowing such action in domestic violence cases); Thurman v. City
of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) (alleging that police violated battered woman's
constitutional right to equal protection by ignoring her repeated attempts to seek police
protection).
148. Uniform Crime Reports revealed that 32% of all reported assaults on police officers
and 16% of all officer deaths recorded during the 10-year period from 1968 to 1977 occurred in
connection with "disturbance cans." However, during those years statistics within the category
of "disturbance can" included not only domestic disturbances but barroom fights and street dis-
turbances as well. The statistics from these years are often cited to demonstrate the danger
posed by cans from battered women, without clarification that only a fraction of the cans in-
volved situations of spousal abuse. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF
THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 13 (1982).
149. JOEL GARNER & ELIZABETH CLEMMER, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, DANGER TO Po-
LICE IN DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES-A NEW LoOK (1986).
150. GAIL A. GOOLKASIAN, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE: A GUIDE FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 34 (1986).
151. Id. at 53 n.25.
152. VICTIM SERVS. AGENCY, THE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO FAMILY VIOLENCE:
A STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO FAMILY VIOLENCE LEGISLATION (1988).
153. Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence 1970-1990, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 46, 64 n.182 (1992).
154. SCHNEIDER, supra note 143, at 33-34.
155. Sarah Bue!, Mandatory Arrest for Domestic Violence, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 213, 214-
15 (1988).
156. Zorza, supra note 153, at 64 n.183.
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Much of this legislative activity has no doubt been catalyzed by
the now famous study conducted by Sherman and Berk157 which sug-
gested that arrest deters subsequent violence more effectively than
other police responses, such as mediation or separating the parties.
Unfortunately, extensive replication efforts provide only equivocal
support for the deterrent effect found in the initial Minneapolis exper-
iment.158 Numerous replications found that arrest of the batterer re-
sults in increased violence toward the battered woman.159 Indeed, Dr.
Sherman recently stated that "mandatory arrests in domestic violence
cases may cause more violence against women in the long run. "160
In many cases, the effects of new domestic assault laws on the
lives of battered women remain undeterminable. The recent changes
in legislation regarding domestic violence have only begun to alter ac-
tion within individual police departments. The practical effect of stat-
utory reform requires corresponding departmental policy and
awareness of the changes by individual officers.161 Many police de-
partments adopted broad policies advocating arrest in cases of domes-
157. Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects ofArrest for
Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REv. 261 (1984). This study initially found arrest to be an effec-
tive deterrent to batterers. Attempts to replicate the deterrent effect evidenced in this work
have met with mixed results. See infra notes 158-79 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence ofCriminology on Criminal Law: Eval-
uating Arrests for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1992). In
attempting to replicate the findings of the Minneapolis experiment, the results in three of the
cities, including Minneapolis, show that arrest has a deterrent effect. But see NATIONAL INST. OF
JUSTICE, THE MEASUREMENT OF RECIDIVISM IN CASES OF SPOUSE ASSAULT (1984); NATIONAL
INST. OF JUSTICE, FEMALE SPOUSE ABUSE AND THE POLICE RESPONSE (1983); NATIONAL INST.
OF JUSTICE, THE VARIABLE EFFECTS OF ARREST ON CRIMINAL CAREERS: THE MILWAUKEE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXPERIMENT (1984). These studies found no real difference in future do-
mestic assault incidents regardless of whether police used arrest, separation, or mediation.
159. Sherman, supra, note 158. But see Franklyn W. Dunford et aI., The Role of Arrest in
Domestic Assault: The Omaha Police Experiment, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 183 (1990). Data from this
study showed that victims whose partners were arrested were no less likely to experience re-
peated violence from that partner than were victims whose partners were not arrested. This
inconsistency may be linked to the source of recidivism data. Several of the same authors later
noted that, regarding efforts to replicate the Minneapolis experiment,
[e]xamination of victim interview data reveals alarmingly high levels of repeat incidents of
spouse abuse, suggesting that the scope of the problem is far greater than police data indi-
cate. Official records, those based on rearrest by police, show predictably lower prevalence
and incidence rates of recidivism than do interview data.
J. David Hirschel et aI., The Failure of Arrest to Deter Spouse Abuse, 29 J. RES. CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 7, 29 (1992).
160. Daniel Goleman, Do Arrests Increase the Rates of Repeated Domestic Violence?, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 1991, at CS.
161. See Helen Eigenberg & Laura Moriarity, Domestic Violence and Local Law Enforce-
ment in Texas: Examining Police Officers' Awareness of State Legislation, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 102 (1991). In assessing the knowledge of Texas police officers regarding changes in
state law, the authors found that 35% did not know they could make a warrantless arrest in cases
of domestic violence when the violation was not witnessed by the officer. Almost one in six
believed that an arrest could not be made unless a serious injury had transpired.
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tic violence162 but failed to take the steps necessary to ensure that
officers implement these policies.163
Despite laudable changes in state legislation and departmental
policies, many police officers clearly remain reluctant to make arrests
in cases of domestic assault.164 Studies reveal that only ten to eight-
een percent of reported domestic violence incidents between hus-
bands and wives resulted in the arrest of the batterer,165 although
injuries to the victim provide prima facie evidence for assault in about
thirty-four percent of domestic disputes attended by police.166 In
states having mandatory arrest laws, the arrest rate rises to approxi-
mately forty percent.167 These statistics do not improve when the bat-
tered woman specifically requests that the police arrest her
assailant.168
162. According to the Washington based Crime Control Institute, the number of police de-
partments inclined to arrest in cases of minor domestic assault tripled in one year, from 14 of 140
major cities in 1984, to 44 of those same cities in 1985. L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1986, pt. I, at 2.
163. Although the number of police departments indicating arrest as their preferred policy
when confronting batterers rose from 10% in 1984 to 31 % one year later, 47% of those depart-
ments made no effort to provide officers with guidelines or instruction regarding the change.
LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICE POLICY ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A NATIONAL SUR.
VEY, CRIME CONTROL REPORTS 1 (1986); see also Maria K. Pastoor, Police Training and the
Effectiveness of Minnesota "Domestic Abuse" Laws, 2 LAW & INEQ. J. 557,562-63,571 (despite
a Minnesota state statute requiring that batterers be arrested, the police chief failed to issue a
statement mandating arrest for almost a year, and individual officers continued to resist imple-
mentation of the law); Philip M. Boffey, Domestic Violence: Study Favors Arrest, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1983, at Cl (although the New York Police Department adopted a policy of mandatory
arrest in domestic violence cases, the policy is reportedly "widely disregarded").
164. DONALD G. DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT ON WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 139, 143-44 (1988).
165. See Lee H. Bowker, Police Services to Battered Women: Bad or Not So Bad? 9 CRIM.
Jus. & BEHAV. 476 (1982) (only 10% of domestic violence cases result in arrest, despite the fact
that grounds for arrest exist in over half of the cases); Ida Johnson, A Loglinear Analysis of
Abused Wives' Decisions to Call the Police in Domestic-Violence Disputes, 18 J. CRIM. Jus. 147
(1990) (18% of domestic assault calls responded to resulted in arrest of the batterer); Douglas A.
Smith & Jody R. Klein, Police Control of Interpersonal Disputes, 31 Soc. PROBS. 468 (1984)
(arrest rate for domestic violence was 11.8%); Robert E. Worden & Alissa A. Pollitz, Police
Arrest in Domestic Disturbances: A Further Look, 18 LAW & Soc. REv. 105 (1984) (arrest rate
for domestic violence in 24 U.S. cities was 10%).
166. Donald G. Dutton, The Criminal Justice Response to Wife Assault, 11 LAW & HUMAN
BEHAV. 189, 197 (1987).
167. See Kathleen J. Ferraro, Protecting Women: Police and Battering (paper presented at
the American Sociological Association, Washington D.C. 1985); see also Kathleen J. Ferraro,
Policing Woman Battering, 36 Soc. PROB. 63 (1989) (stating that after adopting a mandatory
arrest policy, police made arrests in only 43% of the cases where there was probable cause and
the offender was present).
168. Bowker, supra note 165. Police were specifically requested by the battered woman to
arrest in 82% of the incidents considered in this study, but arrest occurred in only 14% of the
cases. Most of the officers either refused to arrest claiming there was no case (27%) or talked
the battered woman into working out differences with the batterer (41%). Another study re-
vealed that 60% of victims asked to have their spouses arrested, but officers complied in only
28% of the cases. Eileen Abel & Edward Suh, Use of Police Services by Battered Women, 1987
SOC. WORK 526.
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Individual officers may consider many factors in determining
whether arrest is appropriate in a given situation.169 Studies of police
response to domestic assault suggest that although legal factors playa
role in arrest decisions,17o extralegal factors are highly determina-
tive.l71 The batterer's criminal record,I72 his belligerence toward re-
sponding officers,173 and his alcohol use during the incident174 all
strongly affect the arrest decision. Although race of the victim and
severity of her injuries have been shown to have little impact,175 her
behavior,176 allegations of violence, and willingness to sign an arrest
warrant177 influence officers' decisions to arrest her assailant. Finally,
if someone other than the battered woman calls police to the scene,
the probability that the batterer will be arrested increases signifi-
cantlyP8 After an arrest occurs, criminal charges may be filed against
the batterer. Depending on the jurisdiction these charges may be filed
by the police officer or by the prosecutor.179
Although the actions of police departments in cases of domestic
violence have received the most intense scrutiny, prosecutors, judges,
and court personnel also have direct and significant effects on the
availability of legal alternatives to battered women seeking protection
from their batterers. Each may hinder or aid the battered women's
attempts to secure criminal and civil remedies. Although police of-
ficers are most often associated with dissuading the victims of domes-
tic assault from proceeding in criminal court, district attorneys have
also been identified as playing this role.180 The discretion inherent in
169. This pattern may vary in jurisdictions which have adopted mandatory arrest laws re-
garding domestic violence.
170. Pam Waaland & Stuart Keeley, Police Decision Making in Wife Abuse: The Impact of
Legal and Extralegal Factors, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 355 (1985).
171. Richard Gondolf & J. Richard McFerron, Handling Battering Men: Police Action in
Wife Abuse Cases, 16 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 429 (1989). The results of this study suggest that
the antisocial characteristics of the batterer, as opposed to the facts surrounding the battering
incident, are strongly related to action taken by police. "Police appear to be responding to anti-
social men who have had previous arrests, abused alcohol, committed general violence, and been
excessively verbally abusive [to the officer]. The level of abuse through the sample was suffi-.
dently extreme to warrant police action, regardless of the antisocial behavior exhibited by the
batterer."
172. Id.; see Sarah F. Berk & Donileen R. Loseke, "Handling" Family Violence: Situational
Determinants of Police Arrest in Domestic Disturbances, 15 LAW & Soc. REV. 317 (1980).
173. See Berk & Loseke, supra note 172; Gondolf & McFerron, supra note 171.
174. Berk & Loseke, supra note 172; Worden & Pollitz, supra note 165.
175. Worden & Pollitz, supra note 165.
176. Waaland & Keeley, supra note 170.
177. Berk & Loseke, supra note 172.
178. Id.; Worden & Pollitz, supra note 165.
179. Lerman & Cahn, supra note 142, at 79.
180. Sarah Eaton & Ariella Hyman, The Domestic Violence Component of the New York
Task Force Report on Women in the Courts: An Evaluation and Assessment of the New York City
Courts, 19 FORDHAM DRB. L.J. 391, 427-28 (1992). .
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the job often acts to keep domestic assault cases out of court.181 Pros-
ecutors may not consider domestic violence a "real crime"182 and may
experience frequent frustration with battered women who drop
charges against their batterers.183 Prosecutors have also been criti-
cized for minimizing charges in cases of domestic abusel84 and demon-
strating reluctance to assist victims with obtaining protection orders
unless the battered women show visible signs of injury.185
Historically, judges have emphasized civil process over criminal
prosecution.186 Advocates still contend that judges lack understand-
ing concerning domestic violence issues, although progress has been
made.187 Judges may fail to believe battered women unless they have
visible injuries188 and may even blame the battered women, presuming
that they provoked the batterers.189 When batterers are processed
through the criminal courts, they are rarely charged with felonies,190
and sentences tend to be lenient.191 This may stem in part from the
attitude expressed by some judges that the woman being battered is as
blameworthy as her violent mate. l92 Ironically, when the violence ul-
timately culminates in the death of one of the parties, men who kill
their wives are far less likely to be charged with murder than women
who kill their husbands.193
181. U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 148, at 23-24; see also Lisa G. Lerman,
Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women,
7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 66-67 (1984).
182. Eaton & Hyman, supra note 180, at 456.
183. Id. at 463; see also LISA G. LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE: INNOVATIONS
IN CRIMINAL JuSTICE RESPONSE, 13, 17-18,23 (1981).
184. Eaton & Hyman, supra note 180, at 462.
185. Id. at 460.
186. Terry Fromson, The Case for Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 135, 150 (1977).
187. Eaton & Hyman, supra note 180, at 410.
188. Report of the New York Task Force on Women In the Courts, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1,
47 (1986-87) [hereinafter Taskforce Report].
189. Id. at 32-33.
190. See Pastoor, supra note 163, at 566 & n.35-37.
191. See CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DE-
FENSE, AND THE LAW 142 (1989). The author notes that although few domestic abuse cases ever
reach court, those that do frequently result in the batterer receiving a suspended sentence or a
small fine. See also Dutton, supra note 166, at 200. Even when the arrest of a batterer ends in
conviction, in most cases this means discharge or probation. If we accept the data, for every 100
wife assaults, about 14 are reported, 7 detected, 1 arrest is made, .75 men are convicted, and .38
men are punished with a fine or jail time.
192. As stated by one judge,
Even if the woman shows up in my court with visible injuries, I don't really have any way of
knowing who's responsible or who I should kick out of the house. Yes, he may have beaten
her, but nagging and a sharp tongue can be just as bad. Maybe she used her sharp tongue so
often that she provoked him to hit her.
GAIL A. GOOLKASIAN, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, CONFRONTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A
GUIDE FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 81 (1986).
193. See Roberta K. Thyfault et aI., When Battered Women Kill: Evaluation and Expert
Testimony Techniques, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL
DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 71-72 (Daniel J. Sonkin ed., 1987); George W. Bernard et aI.,
Till Death Do Us Part: A Study of Spouse Murder, 10 BULL. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L.
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b. Civil Protective Orders
Civil protective orders may include ex parte temporary orders of
protection, permanent orders, and orders to vacate. In forty-nine of
the fifty states, a battered woman can apply for a protective or re-
straining order against her abuser.194 A court may issue a temporary
order of protection on an emergency basis within a few hours of re-
quest, usually after a hearing at which only the victim is present.195
Many states also provide for orders to vacate whereby a judge re-
quires an abusing spouse to temporarily vacate the home with the aim
of allowing time for the resolution of underlying disputes.196 This type
of order is usually issued only when the abused spouse seeks such a
remedy, and victim awareness of this remedy is questionable.197
Generally, when a battered woman files a petition for a protec-
tion order, or seeks to have a temporary order made permanent, the
court schedules a hearing which usually takes place within two weeks
of filing.198 The batterer is served with notice, and both parties may
attend a hearing to determine if the order should be made
permanent.199
Civil protection orders vary from state to state, but usually con-
tain several common provisions. First, they attempt to protect the bat-
tered woman from further violence by limiting the batterer's access to
her.2°O The order may also provide for custody of the children,201 and
typically directs the batterer to leave and stay away from the residence
occupied by the battered woman and her children?02 Protection or-
ders may last up to one year,203 and consequences for violation of such
orders vary from state to state.204 Violation typically l;onstitutes
either contempt of coure05 or a misdemeanor,206 punishable by a jail
sentence or a fine in most states?07 A court hearing is usually re-
quired to prove that a protection order has been violated, and both
the victim and the abuser are allowed to present evidence.208
271, 279 (1982). When a spouse is killed, charges are much more likely to be reduced when the
defendant is male (47.8%) than when the defendant is female (18.2%).
194. NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 141.
195. Lerman & Cahn, supra note 142, at 77.
196. NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 141.
197. ld.
198. See Lerman & Cahn, supra note 142, at 76-77.
199. ld.
200. SCHNEIDER, supra note 143, at 28.
201. ld. at 37.
202. ld. at 28.
203. Lerman & Cahn, supra note 142, at 76.
204. NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 141, at 40.
205. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.2 (West 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.Ol(14)
(West 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-15 (West 1982).
206. SCHNEIDER, supra note 143, at 28.
207. Lerman & Cahn, supra note 142, at 77. In most states, jail sentences are a maximum of
six months, and fines up to $500.
208. ld.
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Although civil protection orders provide a viable source of legal
protection for some battered women, economic, logistical, and sys-
temic factors can render them less useful for others. Twenty-three
states require a filing fee in order to petition for a protection order,209
and almost all of these include the battering spouse's income in deter-
mining a battered woman's eligibility for a fee waiver,210 creating a
difficult problem for the battered woman who is economically depen-
dent on her batterer. Economic limitations may further trap the bat-
tered woman attempting to obtain a protection order by leaving her
unable to hire legal counsel to represent her interests,211 which may
include the exclusion of the batterer from the residence, as well as
custody and child support provisions,z12 This is especially crucial
when the batterer is in a position to hire an attorney or is provided a
public defender because he faces criminal charges which may result in
a jail term,z13
Several noneconomic factors render various types of civil protec-
tive orders difficult to obtain for some battered women. Numerous
states limit protection order remedies to victims who are married or
who live with their abusers,214 effectively ignoring the serious danger
faced by women who are divorced or separated from their batterers.
Despite the emergent circumstances which usually surround incidents
of domestic assault, only twenty-three states provide for the issuance
of protective orders after business hourS.215 Although some states
provide assistance in filing complaints,216 court clerks often serve a
screening function in the petitioning process, and may hinder the bat-
tered woman's pursuit of such an order.217 There are reports that
some judges are reluctant to issue protective orders to battered wo-
men, minimizing the severity of the violence they have endured and
doubting their credibility.218 In addition, some judges reportedly re-
209. NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE. supra note 141, at 19.
210. SCHNEIDER, supra note 143, at 39.
211. Some states have attempted to alleviate this problem, providing legal assistance for the
victims of domestic assault. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.2 (West 1988); TEX. HUM. RES.
CODE ANN. § 51.005(3)(F) (West Supp. 1990).
212. NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 141, at 19.
213. SCHNEIDER, supra note 143, at 39.
214. Lerman & Cahn, supra note 142, at 76. This limitation conflicts harshly with reality.
Although women who are divorced or separated comprise only 10% of the adult female popula-
tion, this group accounts for 75% of all battered women. These women, who no longer live with
their abusers, report being battered 14 times more often than do women still living with their
batterer. CAROLINE HARLOWE, FEMALE VICTIMS OF VIOLENT CRIME 5 (Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics Jan. 1991).
215. NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 141, at 15.
216. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 764 (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518B.Ol(4)(d) (West 1990).
217. SCHNEIDER, supra note 143, at 39.
218. [d. at 38.
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fuse to utilize vacate orders directing batterers to leave, forcing bat-
tered women to flee with their children.219
Once a battered woman obtains a protective order, she is at the
mercy of the police and legal system to enforce it. Police officers
sometimes fail to arrest the batterer for violation of a protective or-
der,220 electing not to pursue violators even in states mandating arrest
in such situations,z21 Judges also sometimes fail to enforce protective
orders,222 tending to scold the batterer for the first violation,223 rather
than rendering punishment. Subsequent violations often result in only
nominal sanctions,224 and some judges hesitate to order jail time or
other punishments for even serious repeat offenders,z25 Some judges
have reportedly charged victims with aiding and abetting violations of
the order by the batterer, holding that the battered woman waives the
order by "letting" the batterer into the home.226 Such approaches to
enforcement often compound the battered woman's difficulties with
police, who may claim they are unable to act without such orders,227
and contradict the representations of other court personnel who
promise victims that civil protection orders will be enforced,z28 From
poor police response to blatant bias by courtroom personnel, some
battered women attempting to utilize protection orders encounter ob-
stacles to receiving aid from a system which is supposed to work for
them,z29
Future availability of effective legal assistance depends partly on
the court's decisions in cases such as DeShaney v. Winnebago County
219. Taskforce Report, supra note 188, at 48.
220. SCHNEIDER, supra note 143, at 40.
221. ld. Despite having a mandatory arrest statute for violations of court orders of protec-
tion, police in Hennepin County, Minnesota, which includes Minneapolis, made arrests in only
22% of the cases where arrest was required by state law. Beverly Balos & Katie Trotsky, En-
forcement of the Domestic Abuse Act in Minnesota: A Preliminary Study, 6 LAW & INEQ. J. 83,
93 (1988).
222. Taskforce Report, supra note 188, at 48.
223. ld. at 44-45; see also Eaton & Hyman, supra note 180, at 443.
224. Eaton & Hyman, supra note 180.
225. See Eaton & Hyman, supra note 180, at 444-45; see also NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE,
supra note 141, at 3.
226. SCHNEIDER, supra note 143, at 38-39.
227. NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 141, at 60.
228. ld. at 52-53.
229. See generally COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., GOVERNOR'S STATEWIDE ANTI-CRIME
COUNCIL, VIOLENT CRIME IN THE FAMILY: ENFORCEMENT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS ABUSE
PREVENTION LAW (Report of the Governor's Battered Women's Working Group 1985). This
report examined the implementation of the Massachusetts Abuse Prevention Law, which, among
other things, provided for civil orders of protection. The report stated that police, prosecutors,
clerks, and judges continued their resistance against providing battered women with protection,
despite the new law. Numerous types of impropriety by the police were reported, including
failure to provide information required by law and failure to arrest batterers for clear violations
of protection orders issued by the courts. Court clerks were found to discourage or actively bar
victims from pursuing legal remedies, and judges engaged in misrepresentations of the law, ap-
plying it unequally among individuals. All court personnel were cited as making frequent biased
comments regarding the race, welfare status and gender of the victims of domestic violence.
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Department of Social Services.230 In DeShaney, the Supreme Court
held that a state child welfare agency had not violated a child's consti-
tutional rights when it failed to protect the child from abuse, despite
reports of abuse that culminated in an investigation by the state
agency. Citing the absence of a "special relationship" between the
child and the state, the Court found that the state had no affirmative
duty to protect the child from his father, and that such a constitutional
duty arises only after the state has undertaken to impose limitations
on an individual's "freedom to act on his own behalf."231 Following
DeShaney, several courts have held that police departments could not
be held liable for their failure to protect individual victims of domestic
violence from their abusers.232 The "special relationship" require-
ment as declared in DeShaney may effectively counter the pressure
generated by years of legislative efforts to improve police responses to
complaints of domestic abuse.
The current availability of assistance such as effective police in-
tervention and enforcement of restraining orders varies significantly
across jurisdictions. Where such alternatives are inadequate or ab-
sent, defendants can argue persuasively that defensive force is neces-
sary despite the lack of an immediate attack. That is, if defendants
have a basis in experience for anticipating a future attack, no duty to
retreat, no access to legal alternatives, and good reason to believe that
they will be unable to effectively protect themselves at the time of the
attack, then they might reasonably believe that immediate defensive
force is necessary to protect themselves from the unlawful use of force
by their batterers. This argument leaves open important questions re-
garding cases in which the defendant was aware of available legal al-
ternatives or in which her belief regarding the lack of legal
alternatives was unreasonable. These questions require consideration
of additional principles of criminal law and are addressed in later
sections.233
In summary, the criminal justice system constitutes an appropri-
ate legal institution to which a battered woman can and should appeal,
but the statutes, policies, and practices of this system may vary signifi-
230. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
231. Id.
232. See Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
police cannot be held liable for failure to arrest absent proof of differential treatment, based on
the court's determination that decisions regarding arrest are within the proper discretionary au-
thority of law enforcement under the holding in DeShaney); Howell v. City of Catoosa, 729 F.
Supp. 1308 (N.D. Okla. 1990) (dismissing the claims of a battered woman against a police de-
partment because individual police officers were under no duty to assist her under the law as
rendered in DeShaney, and there was insufficient evidence of a police policy of indifference
toward the victims of domestic violence); Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (holding that battered women were not entitled to police protection under the state do-
mestic violence statute, and no "special relationship" existed between the victim and the state).
233. See infra notes 282-326 and accompanying text (addressing mistake regarding
justification).
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cantly among and within jurisdictions. Thus, the quality and predict-
ability of intervention available varies substantively across battered
women and their circumstances. Civil protective orders provide an
alternative remedy, but similar concerns regarding consistency and
predictability apply.
8. Summary: The Battered Woman Syndrome or the Pattern of
Battering
A defendant's claim that she reasonably believed that the use of
deadly force was necessary despite the absence of an occurrent attack
requires a broad body of evidence addressing the indicators of forth-
coming violence, the severity of past abuse, the relative size and
strength of the parties, the location of the violence, and the availabil-
ity of assistance. A defendant's ability to secure and present this evi-
dence may vary widely according to the circumstances of the events,
the legal alternatives and assistance available, and the willingness of
others to testify. To demonstrate the reasonableness of her belief that
deadly force was necessary, the defendant must provide the jury with
evidence describing the events and information on which she based
the belief. By doing so, she enables the jury to draw the same infer-
ence that she drew from these events.
Expert testimony regarding depression, decreased self-esteem,
learned helplessness, or other psychological characteristics of the de-
fendant does not show the defendant's "reasonableness." Such testi-
mony may assist the jury in understanding the defendant, but it does
not inform them regarding the events and information that would lead
the jurors to the inference of necessity, enabling them to understand
her corresponding inference as reasonable?34 The evidence required
to establish the defendant's reasonable belief in the necessity of
deadly force must demonstrate the pattern of battering and the lack of
available legal alternatives to defensive force, rather than the pres-
ence of the battered woman syndrome.
B. Credibility and the Failure to Leave Prior to Using Deadly Force
1. Credibility and the Battered Woman Syndrome
As described previOUSly, the credibility argument has usually
taken two forms. First, the defendant may offer testimony regarding
the battered woman syndrome generally to support her claim that she
endured a prolonged pattern of severe abuse without leaving the rela-
tionship. This general testimony supports her credibility by demon-
strating that her conduct as she reports it would not be unusual for a
battered woman. Second, she may offer testimony specifically ad-
234. See infra notes 248-52 and accompanying text (discussing subjective and objective ac-
counts of reasonableness).
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dressing her learned helplessness to explain why she was unable to
leave the relationship earlier.235 Some defendants may offer testi-
mony for either purpose separately, but a defendant might pursue
both purposes by offering expert testimony describing battered wo-
man syndrome generally and her own learned helplessness specifically
as support for the claim that she was unable to leave, explaining why
she did not do so despite the severe abuse.236
Defendants also offer social and economic explanations for their
failure to leave. These might include, for example, their lack of finan-
cial resources or family support, the need to provide food and shelter
for the children, or fear of retaliation from the batterer.237 Such fac-
tors may well improve the defendant's credibility in the eyes of the
jury by providing plausible explanations for the defendant's failure to
leave the battering relationships. These explanations may portray the
earlier failure to leave as reasonable insofar as these practical barriers
might have appeared more difficult to overcome than the periodic
abuse until that battering escalated to a degree of severity that trig-
gered the defensive force. Alternatively, such circumstances might
lead jurors to conclude that the combination of periodic abuse and
practical barriers to leaving would prevent many ordinary people from
making the reasonable decision to leave, making the battered wo-
man's decision understandable if not "reasonable" under the given
standard.
Social or economic explanations that render the defendant's fail-
ure to leave either reasonable or unreasonable but understandable
serve a purpose because the aim of the credibility argument is to
render the defendant's account believable, rather than to portray the
defendant's prior failure to leave as reasonable. Ordinary self-defense
doctrine demands that one act on a reasonable belief that defensive
force is necessary at the time it is exercised; it does not demand that
one demonstrate an ideally reasonable life history. Practical explana-
tions for the defendant's failure to leave earlier appeal to factual cir-
cumstances depriving a defendant of the opportunity to leave or
rendering the decision to leave very difficult rather than focusing on a
defendant's impaired mental and/or emotional state.
The variation of the argument appealing to the battered woman
syndrome relies on learned helplessness as a psychological trait ren-
dering the defendant unable to leave by preventing her from recogniz-
ing and taking advantage of available opportunities to alter her
235. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
236. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 375-77 (N.J. 1984); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 362
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); Kinports, supra note 4, at 398, 400, 416; Schulhofer, supra note 9, at 119.
237. Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377; Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 362; State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 315
(Wash. 1984); Kinports, supra note 4, at 405.
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situation.238 Assuming for the sake of argument that there is evidence
supporting the occurrence of some form of battered woman syn-
drome, and further assuming that the syndrome is pathognomonic to
battered women, then the fact that a particular woman suffers that
syndrome supports the claim that she has been battered.239 Thus, a
pathognomonic battered woman syndrome would support the defend-
ant's credibility regarding her testimony about the battering relation-
ship, and by extension it would support her general credibility or at
lea~t tend to correct the tendency to suspect that she exaggerated. For
this reason, ~~stimony regarding a well-grounded pathognomonic bat-
tered woman syndrome would be relevant to the self-defense claim.
Alternatively, the assumed battered woman syndrome may not
be pathognomonic in that the syndrome may take a form that is also
associated with etiologies other than battering. Walker's data, for ex-
ample, supports the contention that battered women experience ele-
vated depression as compared to the general population.240
Depression is such a common disorder, however, that the presence of
a depressive syndrome would provide no support for the claim that
the person suffering the syndrome had been battered.241 Others claim
that battered women suffer a pathological syndrome similar to that
manifested by those who endure stress or trauma of various types.242
Such a syndrome would provide little support for the defendant's
credibility unless further evidence suggested that the probability of
her having suffered the other relevant forms of stress or trauma was
low. In short, a well-supported pathognomonic battered woman syn-
drome would strengthen the defendant's credibility and a
nonpathognomonic battered woman syndrome might provide less sup-
port for the probability that this particular defendant's suffering that
syndrome is attributable to battering rather than to some alternative
etiology.
238. People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (describing the proffered
testimony of Lenore Walker); Kelly, 478 A.2d at 372, 377; Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 361-62;
Kinports, supra note 4, at 398.
239. A symptom or syndrome is pathognomonic when it is "specifically distinctive or charac-
teristic of a disease or pathologic condition; a sign or symptom on which a diagnosis can be
made." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 977 (26th ed. 1981). Thus, if the bat-
tered woman syndrome were pathognomonic to women who had endured battering relation-
ships, that a particular defendant suffered from the battered woman syndrome would provide
strong support for her claim that she had experienced a pattern of battering. In contrast, if a
defendant suffers a common syndrome such as depression, which occurs in many people in a
variety of circumstances, the mere presence of the depressive syndrome would not indicate any
particular etiology.
240. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (discussing the well-established finding
that battered women suffer depression).
241. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 58, at 229, 231 (discussing the prevalence of
depressive disorders).
242. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text (discussing the general distress response
involving anxiety and depression).
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2. Credibility and the Pattern of Battering
Regardless of the availability of a well-supported battered wo-
man syndrome, evidence confirming a history of battering provides
the best support for the defendant's credibility because it directly sup-
ports the aspect of her testimony that jurors may find dubious. Docu-
ments and witness testimony from various sources can support the
claim of ongoing battering. The defendant's children, relatives,
friends, neighbors, co-workers, medical personnel, or social workers
might have witnessed either the battering or evidence of that. abuse,
such as past injuries or chronic fear of the batterer. Medical records
from emergency room visits might reveal a pattern consistent with
battering, regardless of the explanation that was given for each event
individually. In any particular case such evidence may not be avail-
able, but the same holds true for evidence regarding the claim that the
defendant suffers from the battered woman syndrome, even if one as-
sumes that some battered woman syndrome has been generally estab-
lished. To the extent that experts can testify regarding the general
phenomena of battering relationships, as opposed to this particular
defendant's relationship, testimony regarding the prevalence of such
patterns of battering would support the defendant's testimony more
directly than would testimony regarding the battered woman
syndrome.
A defense attorney should use all available and relevant evi-
dence. However, the attorney should not attempt to establish the bat-
tered woman syndrome at the expense of seeking and presenting
traditional evidence from witnesses and documents. Traditional evi-
dence has the advantages of directly supporting the defendant's credi-
bility regarding the battering and facilitating the process of seeking,
presenting, and admitting the evidence because it is already in a form
with which lawyers and courts are familiar. Expert testimony regard-
ing the syndrome carries potential risk for the defendant. Testimony
regarding the battered woman syndrome, and particularly learned
helplessness, portrays the defendant as one who suffers psychological
impairment undermining the accuracy of her perceptions and judg-
ment regarding the batterer and the relationship. To the extent such
testimony focuses on the defendant's psychological and mental im-
pairment, it may actively undermine her credibility with the jury by
portraying her relevant beliefs as the product of a pathological syn-
drome rather than as reasonable inferences from her experience.243
In short, testimony regarding a well-supported battered woman syn-
drome may be relevant to the defendant's credibility under certain
limited conditions, but as with the claims of reasonable belief regard-
ing the necessity of force or deadly force, traditional evidence demon-
243. See infra notes 256-81 and accompanying text (discussing the battered woman syn-
drome as a pathological syndrome).
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strating the pattern of battering rather than expert testimony
regarding the syndrome is most directly relevant.
IV. SELF-DEFENSE BY BATIERED WOMEN AS JUSTIFICATION
AND EXCUSE
A. Reasonable Belief
Part III identified evidence describing the pattern of battering,
rather- than expert testimony regarding the battered woman syn-
drome, as'the evidence most relevant to the self-defense claim ad-
vanced by battered women who kill their batterers in
nonconfrontational situations. Evidence confirming the pattern of
events leading the defendant to infer the necessity of exercising
deadly defensive force would provide jurors with the basis needed for
them to draw the same inference. Part IV examines several contro-
versial aspects of self-defense doctrine integrating self-defense by bat-
tered women with the broad theory of justification and excuse.
Throughout this section, it is critical to recall that this article advances
a prescriptive theory regarding the manner in which legislatures and
courts ought to address these issues. Not all legislatures and courts
currently do so.
Although the majority of jurisdictions require a reasonable belief
in the necessity of exercising deadly force in self-defense, cases and
commentators continue to debate the appropriate standard of reason-
ableness. Courts frequently frame this issue as a choice between sub-
jective and objective standards.244 This formulation can obfuscate
rather than clarify the issue, however, because it is very difficult to
determine what "subjective" and "objective" mean. In some cases,
two jurisdictions apparently adopt equivalent standards, yet one labels
that test "subjective" while the other describes it as "objective."245
Some cases require that the defendant's belief be reasonable
from the defendant's point of view rather than from the perspective of
the jury.246 Unfortunately, it becomes rather difficult to explain ex-
actly what it means to say that a belief is reasonable from a particular
party's point of view. Ordinarily, standards requiring reasonable be-
lief are labeled "objective" and contrasted to those labeled "subjec-
tive" which take into the account the individual's perspective in that
they address actual mental states of that person.247 Thus, the require-
ment that a belief be reasonable from the defendant's point of view
244. State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 569 (Kan. 1986); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 816-
18 (N.D. 1983); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 314-15 (Wash. 1984).
245. Maguigan, supra note I, at 410 (comparing New York and Washington standards).
246. Allery, 682 P.2d at 314-15; Maguigan, supra note I, at 409.
247. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 15, § 3.7(a)(2) (contrasting objective fault based on a
reasonableness standard to fault requiring subjective awareness).
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seems to call for an objective assessment from the defendant's subjec-
tive perspective, whatever that might mean.
To be reasonable in ordinary language is to be "endowed with
reason . . . sensible ... marked by reasoning ... agreeable to rea-
son."248 Thus a belief is reasonable if it is formed and held according
to reason or for sound reasons. Similarly, an arresting officer arrests a
suspect on the basis of reasonable belief when he makes an arrest on
the basis of "facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's
knowledge, and of which he had reasonably trustworthy informa-
tion."249 A mistake relevant to criminal guilt is reasonable if it is
based on reasonable grounds.250 A person reasonably believes that a
fact exists for the purpose of tort law if he believes it and "the circum-
stances which he knows, or should know, are such as to cause a rea-
sonable man so to believe."251 A reasonable man for this purpose
possesses "normal acuteness of perception and soundness of judg-
ment."252 In short, a reasonable belief, in both ordinary language and
legal usage, is grounded in good reasons and reasoning. That is, a
reasonable belief is formed and held on the basis of ordinarily reliable
evidence as acquired by unimpaired perception and evaluated through
normally sound reasoning and judgment.
The standard of reasonableness takes on particular significance in
cases in which the defendant offers expert testimony regarding the
battered woman syndrome. Psychologists, psychiatrists, or members
of other clinical professions ordinarily present this testimony, empha-
sizing learned helplessness and other psychological characteristics of
the defendant.253 Such testimony apparently portrays the defendant
as suffering certain patterns of psychological impairment, suggesting
to some courts and commentators that it is relevant to insanity or di-
minished capacity rather than to a justificatory defense requiring a
reasonable belief.254 Advocates of syndrome testimony in self-de-
fense cases deny that the syndrome constitutes a mental illness and
offer the testimony to establish the reasonableness of the defendants'
248. II OXFORD ENGLISH DICnONARY, supra note 106, at 2432.
249. BLACKS LAW DICfIONARY, supra note 108, at 1265.
250. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1045-48 (3d ed. 1982).
251. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 135 (1851) (the Supreme Court applies a
similar conception of a reasonable belief as one based on good reasons); RESTATEMENT (SEC.
OND) OF TORTS § 11 (1965).
252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 251, § 11, cmt. (a).
253. State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563, 565-66 (Kan. 1986) (discussing proposed testimony of
psychologist Dr. Ann Bristow); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372-73 (N.J. 1984) (discussing pro-
posed testimony by Dr. Lois Veronen); see supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (discussing
the nature of the testimony offered regarding the battered woman syndrome).
254. See, e.g., State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660, 663-65 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing offered
testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome as addressing mental defect or disorder short
of insanity as not admissible regarding criminal intent); Rocco C. Cipparone, Jr., Comment, The
Defense of Battered Women Who Kill, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 427 (1987) (advocating the use of the
insanity defense by women who kill their batterers while suffering from the battered woman
syndrome); Schneider, supra note 5, at 198-200.
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beliefs regarding the necessity of deadly force?55 To understand the
appropriate role for expert testimony and its relevance to reasonable
belief, one must clarify the meaning of "the battered woman syn-
drome", "mental illness", and "reasonable belief', and examine the
relationships among them.
B. The Battered Woman Syndrome and Mental Illness
Generally defined, the "battered woman syndrome" consists of a
set of psychological characteristics including depression, decreased
self-esteem, and learned helplessness?56 Although advocates deny
that the syndrome constitutes a mental illness, courts and commenta-
tors discuss it as distortion of thought and perception, impaired ability
to perceive and realistically appraise alternatives, and delusions re-
garding the batterer and the relationship.257 This discussion of the
battered woman syndrome as a pattern of impaired psychological pro-
cess is consistent with its categorization as· a syndrome.
A syndrome is a set of symptoms that tend to occur together in a
recognizable pattern.258 A symptom is a sign or manifestation of a
pathological, mental, or physical condition.259 A clinically significant
syndrome of psychological symptoms constitutes a mental or psycho-
logical disorder in contemporary clinical terminology.26o "Disorder"
differs from "disease" in that "disorder" refers to a functional distur-
bance or abnormality without implying any particular etiology. A
"disease", in contrast, is a structural or functional disorder of the body
or part of the body.261 Most recognized psychological disorders are
syndromes rather than diseases in that identifying a pattern of psycho-
logical dysfunction does not in itself imply a specific underlying physi-
cal etiology.262 This does not rule out the possibility, of course, that
some physical disease might cause a particular psychological disorder.
In short, a psychological syndrome is a clinically significant pattern of
impaired psychological functioning, and a psychological disorder is a
recognized syndrome.
255. Hodges. 716 P.2d at 569; Kelly, 478 A.2d at 377-78; Kinports, supra note 4, at 409-22;
Schneider, supra note 5, at 199-215.
256. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text (discussing the usual formulation of the
battered woman syndrome).
257. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (discussing the battered woman syn-
drome as involving disordered perception, thought, and ability to take effective action).
258. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 58, at 405; ROBERT J. CAMPBELL, PSYCHI-
ATRIC DICTIONARY 618 (5th ed. 1981); DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra
note 239, at 1287; II OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 106, at 3210.
259. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 58, at 405; CAMPBELL, supra note 258, at
615; DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 239, at 1285; II OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 106, at 3208.
260. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 58, at 401, 405.
261. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 239, at 385; MICHAEL S.
MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 186-89 (1984); I OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note
106, at 748 (disease), 756 (disorder).
262. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 58, at 401 (defining mental disorder).
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Ordinary and clinical usage defines "illness" in a manner more
consistent with "disorder" than with "disease". People are ill when
they suffer unsound or disordered health involving pain, discomfort,
or inconvenience?63 An "illness" consists of an impairment of func-
tion when measured against some predefined level of health or ade-
quate functioning. Persons are ill when they suffer impairment of
their capacity to function at an ordinary level. They suffer mental or
psychological illness when they suffer functional impairments of
mental or psychological processes?64 Thus, a psychological disorder is
a recognized psychological syndrome, which in turn, is a recognized
pattern of mental or psychological illness.
Legal authorities sometimes fail to clearly state any technical
legal definition of "mental illness", assuming that the clinical term suf-
fices as a legal definition and relying on expert witnesses to determine
whether an individual suffers such an illness.265 Yet, other statutes
and court opinions provide legal definitions of "mental illness" for
specific purposes. Wisconsin's civil commitment statute, for example,
defines "mental illness" for the purpose of commitment as "a substan-
tial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory
which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize real-
ity, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life."266 In McDonald
v. United States, the court defined "mental disease" for the purpose of
that jurisdiction's insanity test as "any abnormal condition of the mind
which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substan-
tially impairs behavior control.,,267
Both of these definitions are consistent with the ordinary concep-
tion of psychological disorder as functional impairment of psychologi-
cal processes. Each describes certain types of functional impairment
of psychological processes and identifies rough criteria of adequate
functioning selected for a specific legal purpose. The Wisconsin com-
mitment statute specifically lists the processes impaired and states cri-
teria in terms of reality relatedness and ability to live independently in
ordinary conditions, because the statute is intended to limit involun-
tary commitment to those who are unable to live safely without con-
finement.268 The McDonald standard addresses impairment
("abnormal condition of the mind") of mental or emotional processes,
263. I OXFORD ENGLISH DI=IONARY, supra note 106, at 1373.
264. MOORE, supra note 261, at 189-95. This brief analysis is sufficient for the purpose of
this paper; we do not pursue the extended philosophic debate regarding the concepts of illness
and disease. See, e.g., ARTHUR L. CAPLAN, CONCEPTS OF HEALTH AND DISEASE (1981).
265. MOORE, supra note 261, at 228-30.
266. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.01(13)(b) (West 1987).
267. McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
268. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.001 (West 1987).
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adopting behavior control as a criterion of adequaCy because the court
understood criminal responsibility as a matter of behavior control.269
Contrary to the assertions of courts and commentators, the bat-
tered woman syndrome, understood as a set of psychological charac-
teristics roughly similar to those usually subsumed under this
syndrome, constitutes a psychological disorder and thus, a mental ill-
ness. Depression is a widely recognized and quite common psycholog-
ical disorder with a well-established clinical syndrome?70 Learned
helplessness as described by the courts and commentators consists of
the battered woman's impaired ability to accurately perceive, evalu-
ate, and adaptively act upon her own situation, the batterer, the rela-
tionship between the two, and her options.271 Some sources
apparently believe that learned helplessness prevents battered women
from recognizing more adaptive alternatives to continuing participa-
tion in ongoing battering relationships, although others seem to inter-
pret the battered woman syndrome as a form of dysfunction that
renders battered women unable to act on alternatives.272 If one ac-
cepts the former interpretation, learned helplessness constitutes im-
pairment of cognitive process, and if one accepts the latter, it
represents some unexplained disruption of decision-making or voli-
tional ability.273 In either case, learned helplessness constitutes a form
of psychological impairment. If battered women regularly manifest
some recognizable pattern of impairment, we can legitimately refer to
their impairment as a syndrome which constitutes a psychological dis-
order frequently suffered by battered women.
Some writers object to the characterization of the battered wo-
man syndrome as a psychological disorder, contending that it is more
appropriately understood as a normal response to an abnormally
stressful situation.274 As described in the literature, the syndrome oc-
curs in response to a highly stressful abusive situation. Other well-
established psychological disorders such as depressive and anxiety dis-
orders occur in response to identifiable precipitants, yet they remain
psychological disorders because the individual suffers a recognizable
pattern of impaired psychological process?75 Similarly, certain types
of psychological impairment such as delusions or hallucinations are a
269. McDonald, 312 F.2d at 851-52. Legal authorities sometimes use various terms such as
mental illness, mental disease, or disorder of mind interchangeably. We will generally use the
term psychological disorder to refer to any functional impairment of psychological processes.
270. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 58, at 218-24, 228-33 (describing widely
accepted depressive syndromes).
271. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
273. ROBERT F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RE.
SPONSIBILITY § 6.3 (1991) (discussing the difficulty with explicating "volitional" impairment).
274. See, e.g., Kinports, supra note 4, at 417; Schneider, supra note 5, at 214-15.
275. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 58, at 247-51 (describing Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder involving anxiety, depression, and other symptoms that occur in reaction to ex-
ternal stressors).
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normal response to certain toxic substances, yet they constitute im-
pairment of psychological process and, thus, symptoms in a recognized
psychopathological syndrome.276 Indeed, fractured bones are a statis-
tically normal and fully understandable response to abnormal physical
stressors such as impact with a moving automobile, yet such fractures
remain pathological.
The claim that the battered woman syndrome is a normal re-
sponse to the situation might mean either that it is statistically normal,
understandable, or free of functional impairment.277 If research sub-
stantiates a syndrome, the first two interpretations may well be accu-
rate, but these do not undermine the categorization of the syndrome
as a psychological disorder. The battered woman syndrome may oc-
cur frequently and understandably to women in battering relation-
ships, just as some of the psychological and physical disorders
discussed previously occur frequently and understandably in response
to various sources of stress. If it does, however, that relationship be-
tween the pattern of battering and the battered woman syndrome
does not render the syndrome less a disorder; rather, it explains the
situational source of the disorder. Only the claim that the syndrome is
a normal response in the third sense is incompatible with the categori-
zation of the syndrome as a psychological disorder. This claim, how-
ever, is also incompatible with the contention that the battered
woman syndrome occurs at all, because the syndrome has been de-
fined as a pattern of psychological impairment which typically occurs
in battered women.
Although some cases apparently interpret the battered woman
syndrome as a psychological disorder and thus infer that defendants
who claim they suffer the syndrome must be raising the insanity de-
fense, this does not follow.278 The insanity defense does not apply to
all who suffer psychological dysfunction; rather, it exculpates those
who suffer disorders giving rise to certain kinds of excusing conditions
regarding their criminal conduct.279 Although insanity standards vary
across jurisdictions and commentators, psychopathology sufficient to
establish the defense usually includes gross distortion of thought or
perception such as hallucinations or delusions.280 The syndrome as
usually formulated does not include such pathology.281
276. Id. at 109-11 (describing Organic Delusional Syndrome and Organic Hallucinosis).
277. I OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 106, at 1492 (normal as conforming to the
usual condition or standard; i.e., statistically normal); III OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1246
(Compact ed. Supp. 1987) (normal as health and not impaired).
278. Schneider, supra note 5, at 198-200.
279. SCHOPP, supra note 273, § 2.1.1.
280. Id. §§ 6.4, 6.5.
281. See supra notes 34-102 regarding the battered woman syndrome. The Torres court re-
fers to "delusions" but does not substantiate that term. Rather this opinion demonstrates the
confusion wrought by the contemporary discussion of the battered woman syndrome. People v.
Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 361 (Sup. Ct. 1985).
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In summary, if future research substantiates a battered woman
syndrome roughly similar to the syndrome as usually formulated by
courts and commentators, that syndrome constitutes a psychological
disorder, and therefore, a type of mental illness in both ordinary and
legal usage. The vague and confused discussion of the battered wo-
man syndrome in court opinions often arises from the attempt to ac-
cept and understand the pattern of psychological impairment
described as the syndrome while simultaneously denying that it consti-
tutes mental and emotional impairment. Although the putative bat-
tered woman syndrome is a psychological disorder, it does not follow
either that a defendant who suffers the syndrome must rely on the
insanity defense rather than self-defense or that the syndrome consti-
tutes the type of disorder that can ground the insanity defense.
C. Reasonable Belief" Justification and Excuse
Courts and commentators find it difficult to explain the relation-
ship of the battered woman syndrome to self-defense because the syn-
drome constitutes a pattern of psychological impairment, rendering it
apparently more relevant to excuse than to justification requiring rea-
sonable belief. Defendants who raise justificatory defenses to crimi-
nal charges concede that their behavior fulfills the offense elements
for the definition of the criminal offense, but they claim they should
be exonerated because their actions were appropriate under the cir-
cumstances. The law not only exculpates defendants who can show
justification, it sanctions their actions. In contrast, those who claim
excuse acknowledge the wrongfulness of the conduct while denying
culpability due to some disability-based excusing condition. Although
commentators debate the precise parameters and significance of these
categories, the basic distinction between defenses that justify conduct
and those that excuse actors is widely accepted.282 Some commenta-
tors question the susceptibility of the criminal law to precise bounda-
ries between justification and excuse.283
Most contemporary authorities classify self-defense as a justifica-
tion, categorizing conduct constituting assault or homicide as accepta-
ble when it is necessary to prevent the exercise of unlawful force
against an innocent party.284 Self-defense constitutes a justification
rather than an excuse because the rationale for the defense rests on
the acceptability of the conduct under the circumstances rather than
282. FLETCHER, supra note 117, § 10.1; H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
13-14 (1968); ROBINSON, supra note 15, §§ 24, 25; Robert F. Schopp, Justification Defenses and
Just Convictions, 24 PAC. L.J. 1233, 1235 (1993).
283. Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept ofJustification in the Criminal Law:
A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61 (1984); Kent Greena-
walt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (1984).
284. FLETCHER, supra note 117, § 10.5; ROBINSON, supra note 15, §§ 131, 132; see supra
notes 128-39 regarding other conditions of the defense such as proportion and retreat.
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on any claim of disability or lack of responsibility on the part of the
actor. The defense reflects the justificatory circumstances consisting
of the unlawful attack on the defendant by the party which the de-
fendant injured and the necessity of the defensive force as the only
available means of preventing unlawful harm to the defendant by the
assailant.285
Understood in this manner, the foundation of the defense rests
on the circumstances in which the defendant exercised defensive
force, rendering the defendant's mental state apparently irrelevant.
Yet, the majority of jurisdictions formulate the defense in terms of a
reasonable belief regarding necessity rather than in terms of actual
necessity.286 This formulation reflects two intuitively plausible con-
cerns. A statute allowing the defense on the basis of actual necessity
regardless of the defendant's beliefs regarding that necessity would
allow exculpation of those who maliciously injured others while una-
ware of the justificatory circumstances, and it would deny exculpation
to those who honestly but mistakenly thought they were acting from
necessity. Yet, some consider both of these results unjust because the
unknowingly justified defendant does not seem intuitively to deserve
exculpation while the mistaken defendant does.287
Statutes formulated in terms of reasonable belief regarding ne-
cessity apparently address both of these concerns in a more satisfac-
tory manner. Malicious but unknowingly justified defendants lack
reasonable beliefs that the justificatory circumstances apply and fail to
qualify for exculpation, while honestly mistaken defendants qualify as
long as their mistakes were reasonable. Finally, these statutes incul-
pate defendants who exercise force as a result of an unreasonable as-
sessment of the circumstances, and these defendants arguably deserve
to be held liable for exerting force without exercising reasonable care.
Despite these apparent advantages, statutes requiring reasonable
belief for justified self-defense remain seriously flawed. Actors may
form unreasonable beliefs for at least three different types of reasons,
generating important discrepancies regarding culpability and justified
liability under these statutes. First, defendants may form unreasona-
ble beliefs because they fail to exercise appropriate care in their evalu-
ation of the situation. A racist defendant, for example, who sees an
individual of another race approaching with a baseball bat, might hon-
estly but mistakenly believe that he is in danger. If this defendant
shot and wounded the approaching person without exercising the care
necessary to notice that he was only one block from a ball field and
that many people on the street were carrying balls, bats, and gloves,
285. ROBINSON, supra note 15, § 132.
286. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
287. ROBINSON, supra note 15, §§ 122,184 (discussing respectively the debates regarding the
unknowingly justified actor and mistakenly unjustified actor); Schopp, supra note 282, at 1258-78
(advancing a theory intended to accommodate these difficult cases).
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we might reasonably conclude that he ought to be held liable for neg-
ligently or recklessly concluding he was in danger. This defendant's
culpability would lie in his exercising potentially lethal force without
exercising a corresponding degree of care in assessing the situation.
In cases of this type, a standard requiring reasonable belief for self-
defense might seem appropriate to many observers. The Model Penal
Code approach addresses some of these cases more precisely, holding
defendants liable for negligent acts.288
Second, defendants may form an unreasonable belief regarding
necessity due to circumstances that limit or distort the information
available to the actor. Suppose, for example, that while walking home
from work, a plumber is confronted in the dark by a person who ap-
pears to be a robber armed with a pistol. When the person says "your
money or your life," the plumber strikes the apparent robber with the
wrench the plumber was carrying home from work. It later becomes
clear that the apparent robber was a retarded person playing a game
with a toy gun. Standard self-defense law accommodates these cases,
however, by specifying that the defendant's belief must be reasonable
in the circumstances. The defendant's belief must be reasonable to
one who sees what she sees and knows what she knows.289 Thus, the
plumber's belief may be unreasonable in light of all relevant informa-
tion, yet reasonable in the circumstances the plumber confronted be-
cause these circumstances provided the plumber with access to only a
subset of the relevant information.
Third, a defendant might form an unreasonable belief as to the
necessity of exercising defensive force due to impaired capacity. Sup-
pose two retarded adolescents get into an argument in the school
doorway when they both try to pass through a door in opposite direc-
tions at the same time. The one attempting to enter the building yells
"I'll get you" and picks up a rock in order to hit the other with it. The
second could simply swing the door closed and call the teacher, but
due to fear and limited intelligence, he never thinks of that possibility.
Instead, he hits the first student in the head with the baseball bat he
was carrying out to the school yard, inflicting serious injury. This de-
fendant's belief was not reasonable in the circumstances because any
reasonable person exercising ordinary care and competence in the cir-
cumstances would have recognized the alternative of closing the door
and calling the teacher. In contrast to the racist defendant in the first
288. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 16, § 211.1(1), (2) (listing the usual culpability ele-
ments for assault); see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (discussing the Model Penal
Code approach which allows self-defense on the basis of belief rather than reasonable belief, but
holds defendants liable for negligent or reckless offenses if those beliefs are held negligently or
recklessly).
289. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (discussing authority for the relevance of
size, gender, and history to reasonable judgments).
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case, this defendant failed to derive a reasonable belief due to lack of
competence rather than inadequate care.
Some readers may conclude that this retarded defendant ought to
be held to the standard of an ordinary person, and thus these readers
would endorse conviction of the defendant in this case. These readers
would find satisfactory self-defense provisions requiring reasonable
beliefs. Those who find this conclusion intuitively unjust might con-
sider several possible strategies. First, there is the Model Penal
Code's approach, requiring only a belief in the necessity of exercising
deadly force rather than a reasonable belieU90 This approach would
also exculpate the racist defendant in the first case, however, and
many readers may think that these defendants differ in a manner that
warrants different treatment?91
Second, some might argue that the defendant's limited intelli-
gence should be considered a circumstance relevant to the reasonable-
ness of his belief. Jurors would then decide whether the belief was
reasonable given a person of such limited intellectual endowment, ap-
plying the standard of the reasonable retarded person. This notion is
difficult to explicate because limited mental capacity directly under-
mines the capacity to reason with ordinary speed and accuracy, appar-
ently generating the notion of the "reasonable person with impaired
reasoning. "292 Such an interpretation renders the reasonable person
standard incoherent in light of both the ordinary and the legal mean-
ing of "reasonable" as grounded in good reasons and good reason-
ing?93 Furthermore, once we incorporate psychological aberration
into the standard of reasonableness, consistency would seem to re-
quire a separate standard for the "reasonable psychotic. "294 If a de-
fendant can demonstrate a long-term pattern of unreasonable beliefs,
attitude, and behavior, should they be measured by the standard of
the "reasonable unreasonable person"?
Although the suggestions that one might formulate standards for
the "reasonable retarded person" or the "reasonable psychotic" seem
implausible, courts and commentators have seriously proposed stan-
dards for the "reasonable battered woman.,,295 Some have inter-
preted the "reasonable battered woman" standard as the conduct of
the reasonable woman who has been battered, or that of the reason-
290. See supra notes 17-19 (discussing the Model Penal Code approach to self-defense).
291. This assumes that both defendants cause injury but not death, and that the jurisdiction
has no negligent assault statute.
292. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 58, at 28-33 (discussing "mental retarda-
tion" as involving arrested development of cognitive functions).
293. See supra notes 248-52 and accompanying text ("reasonable" as involving good reasons
and good reasoning).
294. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 58, at 404 (defining psychotic as involving
serious impairment of reality testing).
295. Maguigan, supra note I, at 442-43 (discussing courts and commentators suggesting a
standard for reasonable battered woman).
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able woman with the battered woman syndrome. Courts and com-
mentators have used the standard in either fashion, and they
sometimes do not differentiate between these two interpretations.
The first variation is merely a statement of the "reasonable woman"
standard variation of standard self-defense doctrine as applied to a
defendant who has been battered. Standard doctrine measures rea-
sonableness in light of all that the defendant knows, including her his-
tory with the person against whom she exercises the defensive
force.296 A reasonable woman who has been battered by the batterer
simply includes this past history in the information she considers in
forming her reasonable belief.297 As a restatement of standard doc-
trine, this interpretation fails to serve its intended purpose because
those who suggest it apparently understand it as a proposal to revise
and improve that doctrine,298 Furthermore, understood in this man-
ner, the proposal calls primarily for ordinary factual evidence support-
ing the defendant's claims regarding the past pattern of abuse rather
than expert testimony addressing the battered woman syndrome.299
The second variation has been proposed as one that more appro-
priately allows for the defendant's battered woman syndrome, includ-
ing especially her experience of learned helplessness.3oo This proposal
ordinarily accompanies the claims that the battered woman syndrome
is not a mental illness and that testimony regarding the syndrome is
relevant to the defendant's reasonable beliefs.30t As argued previ-
ously, however, the syndrome as usually formulated is a psychological
disorder if it occurs at all.302 It is difficult, therefore to contend that
one ought to apply a special standard to the reasonable person with
the battered woman syndrome but ought not apply a special standard
for the reasonable psychotic or the reasonable retarded person. This
approach requires a rationale for indexing reasonableness to one par-
ticular psychological disorder but not to others, and it calls for some
coherent notion of "reasonableness" that can vary according to the
presence of psychological disorders. Psychosis, retardation, and the
presumed battered woman syndrome differ in the manner and degree
296. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (discussing authority for the relevance of
size, gender, and history to reasonable judgments for self-defense).
297. See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
298. Kinports, supra note 4, at 409-22 (endorsing a special standard of reasonableness for
battered women); Maguigan, supra note 1, at 442-45 (discussing such special standards).
299. See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text (discussing the most appropriate forms
of evidence).
300. Kinports, supra note 4, at 396-422 (discussing a special standard for battered woman
and the importance of the battered woman syndrome for the reasonableness of perceptions by
these women).
301. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 377-78 (N.J. 1984) (discussing the battered woman syn-
drome as relevant to the reasonableness of defendant's beliefs); Kinports, supra note 4, at 417-22
(discussing the battered woman syndrome as not a mental illness and as relevant to the reasona-
bleness of the defendant's beliefs).
302. See supra notes 256-81 and accompanying text.
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in which they distort psychological process, but share in common the
property that they involve distortion of psychological process.
Recall the retarded defendant in the school who seems to raise
serious concerns about the reasonable belief standard, and consider
the possibility that there might be an insanity defense available as a
third strategy for exculpating such defendants. Due to the defendant's
intellectual impairment, he believed that his use of force was neces-
sary and therefore justified. Due to his functional impairment of psy-
chological processes, he did not know that his conduct was wrong.
The most common standards for the insanity defense include provi-
sions excusing those whose psychological disorder prevents them from
knowing their conduct is wrong.303 Thus, one could plausibly argue
for inclusion of such a defendant under these provisions.
This approach to the retarded defendant who mistakenly believes
that defensive force is necessary exculpates the defendant but it does
not endorse his conduct as justified. It excuses the defendant for com-
mitting unjustified conduct because he was not culpable for the mis-
taken belief on which he acted, and thus, he was not culpable for his
conduct. A statutory system that observed the distinction between
justification and excuse by justifying on the basis of actual necessity
and maintaining a separate excuse for those who engage in unjustified
conduct because they nonculpably but mistakenly believe their con-
duct to be justified, would accommodate this defendant under that
excuse, bypassing the need to appeal to the insanity defense.304 This
excuse would not apply to the negligently mistaken bigot in the first
hypothetical because his failure to exercise due care before inflicting
serious harm renders him culpable for his mistake. It would, however,
exculpate the plumber who exercised what he reasonably but inaccu-
rately believed to be necessary defensive force in response to decep-
tive circumstances.
An independent excuse for those who mistakenly but
nonculpably believe defensive force is necessary appropriately ad-
dresses the culpability of the defendant rather than the acceptability
of the conduct or the reasonableness of beliefs in circumstances. The
criterion of culpability allows appropriate disposition of all three
cases, inculpating the negligent bigot but exculpating the plumber and
the retarded defendant. Standards that compress justification and ex-
cuse into a single provision requiring reasonable belief in justificatory
conditions accommodate only one subset of nonculpable but unjusti-
fied defendants. These standards exculpate those who, like the
plumber, are misled by deceptive circumstances into forming beliefs
which are false but reasonable in the circumstances. They do not,
303. SCHOPP, supra note 273, § 2.1 (discussing the most common standards).
304. ROBINSON, supra note 15, § 184 (proposing an excuse for mistakes regarding justifica-
tion which addresses the actors' culpability for their mistakes).
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however, appropriately exculpate those defendants, like the retarded
boy in the school, who form unreasonable beliefs through no fault of
their own due to impaired capacities.
One must clearly distinguish reasonable, understandable, and
nonculpable beliefs in order to address these cases and issues in a sat-
isfactory manner. As discussed previously, reasonable beliefs are
formed and held on the basis of ordinarily reliable evidence as ac-
quired through unimpaired perception, and evaluated through nor-
mally sound judgment.305 Although the reasonableness of a belief is
determined by the soundness of the evidence and psychological
processes that produce and maintain it, it might be understandable
that a person would hold an unreasonable belief. That is, others might
understand why a person holds an unreasonable belief because they
can advance an explanation for that person's holding that belief.
These explanations might appeal, for example, to the bigoted defend-
ant's prejudice and lack of due care, or to the retarded defendant's
impaired reasoning ability, to explain how they derived their false and
unreasonable beliefs in the necessity of exercising defensive force.
These explanations render such defendants' beliefs understandable to
others but not reasonable because they explain those beliefs by appeal
to the defendants' unreliable belief-forming processes.
Unreasonable but understandable beliefs can be either culpable
or nonculpable. The bigot's belief, for example, is understandable but
culpable because the explanation that renders it understandable ap-
peals to his negligent failure to exercise due care by seeking and con-
sidering easily available evidence that would have called his belief into
question.306 The retarded defendant's belief, in contrast, is under-
standable but not culpable because the explanation that renders it un-
derstandable appeals to his impaired capacity to reason clearly or
quickly.30? Thus, understandability is a property of the relationship
between a belief and the ability of other parties to explain it, while
reasonableness is a property of the relationship between a belief and
the belief-holder's foundation in evidence and belief-forming
processes for that belief.
Judgments of culpability for a mistaken belief represent attribu-
tions of responsibility for that mistake to the belief-holder as a compe-
tent moral agent. Attributions of culpability for a belief require both
that the individual possessed the capacities of a competent agent and
that she had the opportunity to exercise them regarding this belief.30B
That a belief is understandable, therefore, does not entail any conclu-
sion regarding either its reasonableness or the belief-holder's culpabil-
305. See supra notes 248-52 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 287, 290 and accompanying text (discussing the bigot example).
307. See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text (describing retarded boy example).
308. SCHOPP, supra note 273, §§ 4.2, 4.4, 6.5, 7.4.
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ity because each of these latter properties addresses different
relationships than that addressed by understandability. A fully satis-
factory system of criminal defenses must provide the conceptual struc-
ture needed to evaluate reasonableness, understandability, and
culpability independently.
D. Culpability and Battered Women as Justified or Excused
A statutory scheme justifying self-defense on the basis of actual
necessity, regardless of beliefs, and maintaining a separate excuse for
those who exercise force due to nonculpable mistakes regarding ne-
cessity reflects the conceptual distinctions among reasonableness, cul-
pability, and understandability, and it addresses a particularly
problematic subset of self-defense cases involving battered women.
Battered women who kill their batterers in nonconfrontation situa-
tions must demonstrate not only that further abuse was forthcoming
but also that their own use of defensive force was necessary to prevent
it. Although standard self-defense doctrine does not require that one
retreat from one's own home before exercising such force, it does re-
quire that one make use of available legal protection. Nonconfronta-
tion cases, especially those in which the defendant approaches the
batterer, raise serious questions about the defendant's failure to exer-
cise legal alternatives such as calling the police or securing restraining
orders.309
Some defendants may not have such alternatives available. If the
battered woman called police but they failed to respond or they re-
sponded but failed to make an arrest, for example, she can cogently
argue that effective legal alternatives were not available. Further-
more, a defendant who had unsuccessfully sought legal protection in
the past can reasonably argue that her experience demonstrates that
such alternatives are not available.310
Defendants who have not personally sought legal assistance
might demonstrate the necessity of defensive force through expert tes-
timony regarding the lack of effective legal protection in their jurisdic-
tions. Although many jurisdictions have recently initiated new
statutes, policies, and practices to provide more effective legal alterna-
tives to defensive force for many battered women, the practical effect
309. See, e.g., People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Nor-
man, 378 S.E.2d 8, 9-11 (N.C. 1989); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 313-14 (Wash. 1984).
310. The issue may be more complex if the defendant has not received assistance because
she refused to cooperate with legal officials. Suppose, for example that this defendant has previ-
ously elicited assistance from officials but then changed her story or refused to cooperate in the
prosecution of the batterer. These circumstances raise the additional question regarding defend-
ants' responsibility for causing the conditions of their own defenses. See Paul H. Robinson,
Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law
Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REv. 1 (1985).
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of these changes varies widely, and no one suggests that all battered
women have access to effective legal protection across jurisdictions.311
Defendants who can enter evidence to demonstrate that their ju-
risdictions have not yet established reliable patterns of effective legal
intervention in battering relationships can use this evidence to support
the claim of necessity required for justified self-defense. That is, by
showing that the past pattern of battering supports their claims that
serious bodily injury was forthcoming and that they would be unable
to protect themselves at the time of the attack, and by showing that
effective legal protection was not available in their jurisdiction, they
can support their contentions that their own exercise of force was nec-
essary to prevent the unlawful use of force against them.312
A penal code clearly differentiating justification based on actual
necessity from excuse based on nonculpable mistake regarding neces-
sity would accept as justified the defensive force exercised by these
defendants who lack legal alternatives. This justification defense
would reflect the circumstances necessitating their defensive force and
would require no inquiry into the defendants' beliefs or into the rea-
sonableness, understandability, or culpability of those beliefs. Some
battered women, for example, might kill their batterers out of a desire
for revenge in circumstances in which they believed they had effective
legal alternatives, although in fact they did not. These unknowingly
justified defendants would qualify for a justification defense based
upon actual necessity because their conduct was justified by the cir-
cumstances. They would remain vulnerable, however, to attempt lia-
bility because their conduct would have constituted homicide had the
circumstances been as they believed them to be.313
Some battered women might kill their batterers out of desire for
revenge in circumstances of actual necessity. Suppose, for example,
Jones accurately believes that her batterer will beat her severely, as he
has previously, when he awakens from his drunken stupor. Jones at-
tempts to call the police, but discovers that the January blizzard
preventing her from leaving her isolated farmhouse has also blown
down the telephone lines, preventing her from securing legal assist-
ance. Jones responds to this discovery with malevolent glee, realizing
that these circumstances create actual necessity because the forthcom-
ing beating is virtually certain, she will be unable to defend herself at
that time, and legal assistance is not available. She plunges a kitchen
311. See supra notes 140-233 and accompanying text (discussing the current state of criminal
and civil alternatives available to battered women).
312. Recall that we argue that the law ought to be understood in this manner, not that this
argument would currently succeed in all jurisdictions. The purpose here is to explain to courts
and legislators why the law ought to be formulated and interpreted in a manner consistent with
this argument.
313. ROBINSON, supra note 15, § 122; Schopp, supra note 282.
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knife into her batterer's chest, delighted by the opportunity to exploit
the justificatory circumstances.
Some readers might respond intuitively that Jones did not de-
serve a defense due to her malevolent delight in killing the batterer.
These readers might contend that Jones killed the batterer because
she wanted to, rather than because she had to.
Justification defenses exculpate actors because their conduct was
acceptable under the circumstances, not because they manifest admi-
rable attitudes.314 Suppose Smith is carrying his softball bat home
from a softball game. As he turns a corner, he encounters Spike in the
act of swinging a tire iron at Mother Beneficence in order to steal the
alms she has collected for the poor. As the attack is already in pro-
gress, Smith has only two choices; he can hit Spike with the bat, pro-
tecting Mother Beneficence, or he can refrain, allowing Spike to
severely injure Mother Beneficence. Suppose also that as Smith per-
ceives the situation, he feels no concern for Mother Beneficence, but
he recognizes Spike as someone he has always hated and experiences
a sensation of delight when he realizes that he now has an opportunity
to attack Spike as he has always wanted to.
Although Smith's intervention with the bat is motivated by his
hatred for Spike, it seems clear that Smith acts as he ought to. Some
readers might evaluate Smith's character more positively if he were to
intervene from a sense of duty or from concern for Mother Benefi-
cence, but few would argue that he ought to allow Spike's attack to
continue rather than act from impure motives. Smith's act seems
clearly the more justified of the only two available options. When
forced to choose between intervening in a manner that injures the cul-
pable Spike or refraining and allowing comparable injury to the inno-
cent Mother Beneficence, Smith justifiably chooses the act that directs
the unavoidable injury toward the party whose culpable attack creates
the need for someone to absorb such injury. Although Smith acts with
malice, Smith performs the right act, and therefore, Smith's act is
justified.
Jones, like Smith, engages in acceptable conduct under the cir-
cumstances. Smith and Jones both encounter circumstances in which
they must act in a manner that directs forthcoming injury either to-
ward the culpable party who embodies the danger or toward an inno-
cent victim. The malicious satisfaction that each experiences might
affect one's evaluation of the actor's characters, but it does not alter
the conditions that justify the acts. The mere fact that the same per-
son fills the roles of innocent victim and intervener in the Jones story
creates no morally relevant reason that renders the intervention less
justified. Distinct justification defenses addressing justificatory cir-
314. Schopp. supra note 282 (discussing justifications as exceptions to general prohibitory
norms).
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cumstances and excuses addressing culpability facilitate satisfactory
analysis and disposition of such cases by directing attention toward
the presence or lack of justificatory circumstances rather than toward
the actor's motives or beliefs.
A clear distinction between justification defenses grounded in
justificatory circumstances, and excuses recognizing the defendants'
lack of culpability facilitates differential analysis of at least three addi-
tional types of cases involving self-defense claims by battered women.
First, evidence presented to the court may demonstrate that legal pro-
tection was available and that this defendant resorted to violence de-
spite being aware of these alternatives. Second, evidence may
establish that such alternatives were available but that the defendant
exercised force because she was unaware of these opportunities.
Third, the court may lack reliable information about the availability of
legal protection because the jurisdiction lacks a reliable pattern of
performance in this area.
Consider each type of case in sequence. The first set of cases
involves defendants who resorted to violence despite their awareness
of effective legal alternatives. Self-defense arguments probably would
not succeed for these defendants, but there is no reason they should.
These cases would involve the knowing use of unnecessary force, and
homicide statutes would appropriately apply, although provocation
may reduce the appropriate degree of homicide.315
The second set of defendants resorted to violence because they
mistakenly believed that they lacked legal alternatives and thus that
defensive force was necessary for self-protection. If the penal code
compresses justification and excuse into a single provision by granting
a justification defense to those who reasonably believed their force
was necessary, the court must inquire into the reasonableness of these
defendants' beliefs. Although not necessarily decisive, the evidence
before the court indicating that alternatives were available weighs
against the defendants in this inquiry. This evidence may be mislead-
ing in that the court's opportunity to gather and weigh this evidence
differs significantly from that of the defendants who must decide and
act under great stress, but the stronger the evidence demonstrating the
availability of legal alternatives, the stronger the inference that the
defendant's contrary belief was not reasonable.
An appeal to the battered woman syndrome cannot render these
defendants' beliefs reasonable. As a syndrome, the battered woman
syndrome constitutes a pattern of psychological dysfunction which
cannot provide the foundation in reliable evidence and belief-forming
315. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 16, § 210.3(1) (indicating extreme mental or emo-
tional disturbance reduces murder to manslaughter); LAFAVE & Scan, supra note 15, § 7.10
(discussing provocation and manslaughter).
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processes needed to establish a belief as reasonable.316 If fuither re-
search supports the battered woman syndrome as a clinical syndrome,
and if clinical evidence supports the contention that a particular de-
fendant suffers from that syndrome, her suffering may well explain
why she believed her action necessary. Such an explanation might as-
sist the jury in understanding, for example, that due to learned help-
lessness, the defendant perceived the batterer as omnipotent and
failed to recognize the availability of legal assistance. By appealing to
learned helplessness, this explanation renders the belief understanda-
ble rather than reasonable, however, and understandability entails
neither reasonableness nor any conclusion regarding culpability.317
One cannot resolve these cases by modifying the notion of reasona-
bleness for the reasons discussed previously.318 Rather, one must rec-
ognize the distinction between defenses reflecting justificatory
circumstances and those recognizing the actor as lacking culpability.
A separate excuse for those who exercise force due to a
nonculpable mistake regarding justification emphasizes the defend-
ant's culpability for her mistake rather than the reasonableness of her
belief constituting the mistake. From this perspective, the central
question is not whether she had good reason for her belief, but rather
whether she is appropriately held culpable for it. The retarded de-
fendant in the school discussed earlier lacked good reason for his mis-
taken belief that force was necessary, but he was not culpable for his
mistake because it was the product of defective capacities.319
Assuming for the sake of argument that the battered woman syn-
drome occurs as now formulated, learned helplessness may constitute
an impairment analogous to that of the retarded defendant in that it
undermines the individual's ability to accurately assess the relevant
information and draw appropriate conclusions. Learned helplessness
differs from retardation in that it is a relatively narrow impairment,
affecting only the battered woman's ability to accurately perceive and
evaluate the batterer, the relationship, and her options regarding that
relationship. This could be sufficient in some cases, however, to gen-
erate a nonculpable mistake regarding her ability to secure legal pro-
tection.320 Under this rationale, a defendant suffering the
hypothetical battered woman syndrome might qualify for excuse be-
316. See supra notes 248-52 and accompanying text (discussing reasonable beliefs as those
based on good reasons and good reasoning).
317. See supra notes 305-08 and accompanying text (distinguishing reasonableness and
understandability).
318. See supra notes 248-52 and accompanying text (discussing the ordinary and legal con-
ception of reasonableness).
319. See supra notes 290-94 and accompanying text (describing the example of the retarded
boy).
320. We put aside the apparent tension between claims of learned helplessness and her ac-
tive self-help in the form of killing the batterer. For discussion of that issue, see supra notes 68-
69 and accompanying text.
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cause the syndrome produces an unreasonable but nonculpable mis-
taken belief that she lacks any alternatives to violence.
Alternatively, assume for the sake of argument that additional
research fails to support the claim that the battered woman syndrome
occurs. This failure would not undermine the well-documented exist-
ence of battering. In the absence of the syndrome, the battered wo-
man remains an individual who suffers periodic assaults. Given the
prior assumptions regarding the forthcoming abuse and her inability
to protect herself at that time, she might exercise force in a noncon-
frontation situation out of fear of the anticipated abuse. If legal alter-
natives were available but her abuse-driven fear led her to believe that
her defensive force was necessary, the jury must determine in each
case whether the severity of the abuse and her resulting fear was suffi-
cient to render her mistake nonculpable rather than negligent or reck-
less.321 Thus, a statutory system separating justification defenses from
excuses for nonculpable mistakes regarding justification would pro-
vide these defendants with plausible arguments for exculpation.
A clear distinction between justification and a separate excuse for
nonculpable mistakes explicates the intuition represented by the pro-
posals for a subjective standard of reasonableness or for a "reasonable
battered woman" standard.322 The plumber who strikes the retarded
"assailant" with the toy gun reacts reasonably to the circumstances
with which he is confronted. Although the force is not justified when
all the relevant circumstances are known, the plumber responds in a
reasonable manner to the circumstances presented during the "at-
tack," and thus, he behaves responsibly. Because he behaves respon-
sibly, he is not culpable or blameworthy for his actions.323 Thus, he is
appropriately excused for his nonculpable mistake.
The retarded boy in the school door and the battered woman who
fails to exercise available legal alternatives due to her battered woman
syndrome or abuse-driven fear also lack culpability for their mistaken
beliefs that contribute to their unjustified uses of force. The
plumber's misleading circumstances, the retarded boy's impaired ca-
pacities, and the battered woman's battered woman syndrome or
abuse-driven fear all constitute factors relevant to the appropriate ex-
culpation of these defendants because they defeat ascriptions of culpa-
bility. Thus, courts should engage in subjective inquiries regarding
321. This interpretation assumes a conventional interpretation of justification and excuse.
For an alternative account that would address some of these cases as systemically complete miti-
gation, see Schopp, supra note 282.
322. See supra notes 295-302 and accompanying text (discussing the "reasonable battered
women" proposal).
323. The plumber is neither culpable nor blameworthy, rendering this distinction irrelevant
to this case. For a discussion of conditions under which this distinction can become significant,
see Schopp, supra note 282.
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these defendants, but these inquiries are relevant to culpability and
excuse rather than to standards of reasonableness for justification.
Finally, consider the third set of cases in which the court lacks
clear information regarding the availability of legal assistance in this
jurisdiction at the time the defendant exercised force against the bat-
terer. If the court cannot ascertain this information at trial, it proba-
bly would not have been available to the defendant when she
exercised her force against the batterer. If the penal code compresses
justification and reasonable mistake regarding justification into a sin-
gle defense by allowing the justification for those who reasonably be-
lieved their conduct was necessary, it seems plausible to say that one
cannot reasonably believe that legal alternatives are not available in
the absence of information. That is, if one has no reliable information
regarding alternatives, one does not have good reason to conclude
that they are unavailable and therefore, that lethal action is justified.
One can only conclude that one does not know whether it is justified.
Thus, one who lacks information providing good reason to believe
that alternatives are unavailable cannot reasonably believe that defen-
sive force is necessary.
By addressing justification defenses and nonculpable mistakes re-
garding justification separately, the criminal law can accommodate
these cases appropriately through an analysis parallel to that which
has already been discussed. Although these defendants lacked relia-
ble information regarding legal alternatives, it remains true that in
each case such alternatives either were available or they were not. If
they were not, the defensive force was justified by actual necessity. If
the alternatives were available but the defendants' battered woman
syndrome or abuse-driven fear led them to believe that they were not,
the juries would have to determine for each defendant whether the
severity of the syndrome or the abuse was sufficient to render that
defendant's mistake nonculpable rather than negligent or reckless.
The former conclusion would generate exculpation under the excuse
for nonculpable mistake regarding justification, and the latter would
result in liability for negligent or reckless homicide.
This practical result is less than fully satisfactory for two reasons,
but these concerns arise from the realistic problems involving factual
uncertainty rather than from inadequacies in the law. First, the jury
would face difficult determinations of fact in the absence of satisfac-
tory evidence or clear criteria of adequacy. They would have to make
judgments, for example, of the probability that assistance was avail-
able, of the potential danger to the defendant in an unsuccessful call
for assistance, and of the severity of each defendant's battered woman
syndrome or abuse-driven fear. Although these determinations are
troubling, so are many similar judgments juries must make in other
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types of cases.324 Second, some cases would result in exculpation in
circumstances which would render it impossible for anyone including
the jury to differentiate justification from excuse. Although this result
would blur the expressive significance of the decision, it reflects the
unavoidable responsibility of courts to make decisions in conditions of
uncertainty.
In short, a penal code that maintains a rigorous distinction be-
tween justification and excuse by separating self-defense justified by
actual necessity from excused mistakes can accommodate many of the
problematic cases. Those who fail to qualify under this interpretation
are those who have the weakest claims to exculpation because they
knowingly refuse to take advantage of available legal alternatives.
Furthermore, this approach relies primarily on evidence of the pattern
of battering rather than on the tenuous support for the battered wo-
man syndrome. Finally, it is consistent with the conceptu~l and nor-
mative foundations of self-defense, and it clarifies the relevance of the
battering evidence for the appropriate defenses.325
Compressing these defenses into a single provision and interpret-
ing "reasonable belief' as innocent, blameless, or nonculpable beliefs
blurs the conceptual distinction between justification and excuse.
Although both justification and excuse exculpate, conflating the two
in a single defense can also have practical significance. First, it can
have practical effects on the rights and duties of third parties who may
become involved.326 Second, it distorts the expressive function of the
324. The criminal law can address error preference regarding some of these issues through
procedural devices such as the burden of proof. A discussion of procedural issues would extend
beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Maguigan, supra note 1 at 437-42, 451-58 (discussing
procedural and evidentiary recommendations).
325. Although the excuse for nonculpable mistake regarding justification appropriately ad-
dresses some cases involving battered women, the experience of battering is neither necessary
nor sufficient for the excuse. The analysis presented throughout this article demonstrates that
battering is not sufficient because some battered women who kill their batterers qualify for justi-
fication rather than excuse, and some qualify for neither. Battering is not necessary for the
excuse because the core of the exculpatory condition consists of the distorted information, im-
paired capacities, or other significant conditions that render the defendant nonculpable for the
mistake. Notice that a defendant who makes such nonculpable mistakes regarding justification
due to significant psychological dysfunction might also be subject to the insanity defense or to
civil commitment.
326. FLETCHER, supra note 117, §§ 10.1.1, 10.5.4(B); ROBINSON, supra note 15, § 121(d).
Fletcher and Robinson contend that justification defenses create a social matrix of duties and
responsibilities such that third parties may assist a justified actor and may not resist or interfere.
Excuses do not carry corresponding significance for third parties. For an alternative theory ad-
vocating a revised social matrix of duties and responsibilities, see Schopp, supra note 282. All
three commentators agree that justifications and excuses differ in their significance for third
parties.
The revised social matrix and the analysis advanced in this article would provide a justifica-
tion defense for third parties who assist battered women in killing their batterers in certain lim-
ited conditions. A complete explication would require a lengthy addition to this article, but the
basic form of the analysis is that a third party would be justified in assisting the battered woman
when all the conditions articulated here for the exercise of justified deadly force by the battered
woman continued to apply despite the availability of the third party assistance.
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criminal law because it becomes impossible to determine whether a
particular decision expresses approval of the defendant's use of force
or merely absolves her of responsibility.
Third, the failure to clearly differentiate justification and excuse
can undermine legitimate exculpatory defenses for defendants such as
those previously discussed who exercised deadly force due to an un-
reasonable but nonculpable belief that they lacked legal alternatives.
Finally, conflating the two types of defenses promotes the current
state of confusion regarding the putative significance of expert testi-
mony regarding the battered woman syndrome for claims of self-de-
fense. It is at least plausible to suspect that juries might be more likely
to arrive at legally and morally defensible verdicts when presented
with distinct claims of justification and excuse accompanied by in-
structions and evidence clearly identified with each. We should con-
sider the possibility that some cases in which expert testimony was
admitted resulted in intuitively unsatisfactory decisions because of
that testimony rather than despite it.
V. CONCLUSION
The controversy regarding battered women who kill their batter-
ers in the absence of occurrent attacks or threats demonstrates the
critical importance to the criminal law of empirical rigor, careful at-
tention to the jurisprudential foundations of legal doctrine, and the
integration of the two. Although expert testimony regarding the bat-
tered woman syndrome has been widely endorsed by courts, commen-
tators, and statutes, the battered woman syndrome lacks empirical
support as a clinical syndrome. Furthermore, the battered woman
syndrome bears almost no relevance to rigorously formulated and in-
terpreted self-defense doctrine. If future research were to provide ad-
equate empirical support for the battered woman syndrome, the
syndrome could have limited relevance when admitted for the pur-
poses of supporting the defendant's credibility or advancing an excuse
for nonculpable mistake regarding justification.
When justification and excuse are distinguished, other central
concepts of self-defense doctrine are clarified, and expert testimony
regarding the syndrome is differentiated from ordinary factual evi-
dence and expert testimony regarding the pattern of battering, many
of the problematic issues and cases can be addressed more satisfacto-
rily. A statutory scheme providing justification defenses based on ac-
tual necessity and separate excuses for nonculpable mistakes
accommodates many of the most troubling circumstances in which
battered women kill their batterers in nonconfrontational situations.
Some of these defendants would qualify for a justification defense, but
others would be excused. Finally, some would fail to qualify for either
type of defense. Thus, this approach has the additional virtue of
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avoiding a new stereotype by treating each battered woman in the
manner appropriate to the circumstances in which she acted.
Evidence regarding the pattern of battering, rather than the bat-
tered woman syndrome, addresses the critical issues most directly.
Many cases remain difficult to decide satisfactorily, but these cases
reflect the widespread practical impediments to accurately recon-
structing and evaluating past events as well as the ordinary require-
ment that courts decide under conditions of uncertainty. These
difficulties are not unique to the substantive legal doctrine of self-de-
fense generally or to cases of defensive force exercised by battered
women specifically.
